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

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MODERN THEORIES OF SIN

by

John Eckel Riley

(A.B., Eastern Nazarene College, 1930)

submitted in partial fulfilment of the
requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts

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OUTLINE
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MODERN THEORIES OF SIN

John E. Riley

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THESIS

Modern Theories of Sin

John Eckel Riley

I

Introductory.

A. Modern interpretation of sin.

1. Popular attitude on the question of sin.

Sin, like its infinite Judge, has been escorted to the edge of the universe and politely bowed out. There are many unenlightened people and super-sensitive consciences that still shudder before this chimera of the past, but the sane, critical, unbiased minds of the day no longer have any fear of or use of it except for rhetorical purposes. Psychology and the anthropocentric method in general have revealed the relativity of morals and have given a rational account of their origin and nature. Science and the rejection of authority have decided that God does not have much, if anything, to do with us; he may have set us up in business some time or other, but he has certainly left us to determine our

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own weights and measures. Then certainly it is ridiculous to establish any standard of conduct other than socially agreeable utility.

Harry Elmer Barnes in one of his iconoclastic speeches says that the "new cosmic perspective and Biblical criticism, indeed, rule out of civilized nomenclature one of the basic categories of all religious and metaphysical morality, namely, sin. One may admit the existence of immorality and crime, but scarcely sin, which is by technical definition a wilful and direct affront to God - a violation of the explicitly revealed will of God." After some further discussion, he concludes, "Consequently if we do not and can not know the nature of the will of God in regard to human behavior, we can not very well know when we are violating it. In other words, sin is scientifically indefinable and unknowable. Hence sin goes into the limbo of ancient superstitions such as witchcraft and sacrifice. The pycho-analyses have already shown that the 'sense of sin' is but a psycho-physical attribute of adolescent sentimental development."[1]

Most beliefs are not based upon logic, though they probably are remotely connected with some logic or facts; they are rather based upon the temper of the mind. And this is true of the thought world today; a one-sided set of facts has made the modern mind agnostic, atheistic, and irreligious.

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[1] A Scientist's Blast at God and Sin. Literary Digest Jan. 26,'29

Joseph Wood Krutch's book "The Modern Temper" has such chapter heads as The Tragic Fallacy, Disillusion with the Laboratory. He says, "adopt a certain style of living and acting, exactly as an artist adopts a certain style for the execution of a work of art" - morality is just fidelity to that style of living. There is no good reason for idealism; "love is at times only a sort of obscene joke" and much the same may be said for all of life's ideals. "But the joke," he adds, "is one which turns quickly bitter upon the tongue, for a great and gratifying illusion has passed away, leaving the need for it still there." Then with the persistent pessimism of Bertrand Russell he says, "Ours is a lost cause and there is no place for us in the natural universe, but we are not for all that sorry to be human. We should rather die as men than live as animals." *1

This is not the only temper of the modern mind; it is but one of a thousand. On the whole, however, the modern mind is skeptical and optimistic, - skeptical of anything ancient or supernatural, optimistic in its belief in human progress and in its faith in the power of man. It has cast aside everything of the absolute in religion and ethics, and has courageously put its trust in relativity. It has been forced, on the one hand, to acknowledge the relativity of 'things as they seem'; on the other hand, it has not thought

*1. A review in The Catholic World, May 1929

deeply enough to find the absoluteness of some 'things as they are'. It is moral and irreligious, - moral because it is more socially conscious than it ever was before, irreligious because the finding of natural causes and the satisfaction that comes with social service (in the profound sense) has abolished the need of God. It is refreshingly frank and bold; it ruthlessly investigates sacrosanct regions and finds that with investigation the mystery vanishes.

The prohibitions of the past are coldly and irreverently scrutinized; many of them go by the board. It is natural that the belief in the tentativeness of morals should lead to the feeling that what a man wants he should have. Morals are in the test tubes of experience; a few valid conclusions have been made, but very few; since all the facts are not in, the basest metal challenges the purest gold and none can rebuke it. To change the figure, "it is about as hard to get a conviction of sin these days in the courts of God as it is to get a conviction of Volstead violation in the courts of New York." *[1] And that is not strange, for there is no court of God and there are no laws and of course there is no punishment. This modern release from the prison of well known, unquestionable responsibility has resulted in a devil-may-care pursuit of "thrills" and a glorious run of the gamut of life's emotions. Recently I read in a Boston

*1. The Vanishing Sinner. Harper's November 1930

newspaper of a suicide: the young man, brilliant, popular, had tried everything else and had found himself bored; apologizing for leaving his body before a friend's residence, he tried the last thing, death. Men have always been doing that and I do not think our fair generation is going to die by its own hand, but no one questions that there is released in society a new force~~,~~ of freedom, terrible and yet glorious.

The great antidote for the dangers of this freedom is the deep, abiding humanitarianism of the day, the sense of the glory of man's own self and the sense of duty to society as a whole. These are the two great foci of interest, not self and God, the older order, but self and society. Would you accuse a man today, you must show him that he is harming society and blighting his fellowman; there is little use to iterate the threatenings of Jehovah or the longsuffering of the Father. The thunderstorm is no longer the wrath of God; as for the Father caring for us - we are too thoroughly taken up with the surge of life to bother with God and if He is so great he doesnot need our attention. Religion has lost its place as a determining factor of life; it ~~is~~ still remains as one of the arts and is relatively safe when conserved by beautiful cathedrals and organ music. Where it ~~s~~ survives, it is aesthetic and ritualistic; that kind of religion generally can find a place even in the scientific, critical mind.

Miles H. Krumbine [1] asks if we are to have a non-moral religion: "The age of moral fervor is ending; the era of the aesthete has begun. The raucous voice of the prophet must take on the soothing modulation of the priest." Robert Hall was upset for a week because by reading Miss Edgeworth "he saw a picture of a world of happy, active people without any visible interference of religion. It was a sensible world, and , on the whole, a very healthy world, and yet a world without any warnings and exhortations, without any apparent terrors concerning the state of souls. The sanctions, restraints, and aspirations that religion confers were totally lacking, and yet the world was happy, prosperous, and well off.... Are we not on the verge of exactly that experience? Our only hope will turn on the emergence of a group of prophets who can again socialize and moralize God as a group of prophets did once, eight centuries before Christ."

Theology could once appeal to ethics for support, but now science is doing away with sin and calling it ignorance and weakness. "The objectivity granted to the deliverance of the moral consciousness, either by the 'intuitional' school in its theory that the moral axiom is eternal and immutable, a subject of cognition equal to the axioms of geometry or logic, or of the 'practical reason' school, which, following Kant in isolating the moral faculty from intellec-

[1]. Atlantic Monthly. December 1929

tual explanation, yet gave to it absolute validity - such objectivity is either denied or ignored by the new school in Ethics." *1 "The moral concepts are based upon emotions, and the contents of an emotion fall entirely outside the category of truth." *2 The failure of society to rise to an adequate concept of sin is not due to low standards as much as it is to philosophical and scientific evolution. It seems that, unless there is a reconciliation of the theological, redemptive view and the worldly, hopeful, evolutionary view, the former will disappear altogether.

Allowing for the distinction between the breaking of God's law and the breaking of society's law the modern mind rejects or ignores the first (which is sin in the strict sense) and denies the objective authority of the second (morals). If the second is being shaken to its very roots, the first can have little hope of surviving. Since there is no great interest in religion or theology, there can hardly be any great interest in sin, for that is the one thing most gladly dispensed with even by theologians. The sense of sin can only exist where there is a consciousness of imperfection and guilt; that is the sense of sin. Now, on the ~~other~~ one hand, psychologists are showing us that much of what is called a sense of sin is an inferiority complex and can be remedied by mental clinics. On the other hand, the immanent, perfect

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*1. Orchard's Modern Theories of Sin. page9
*2. Ibid. page 10 (quoted from Westermarck)

God is being dismissed by the scientific spirit and with him goes the sense of sin which is felt by finite beings before the Infinite. Thus the sense of sin is being dissolved away from both ends.

The popular mind, like Humanism, is trying to retain the higher spiritual values of personality without keeping God. And many who would keep God are accomodating Him to their own ideas by extracting sin from their theology. The question is, Can we have God without a sense of sin? And can we have high morals, in the long run, without God? Popular thinking to the contrary, I think we must answer both questions in the negative. The Catholic World comments on the statement of Harry Elmer Barnes already mentioned as follows: "There is a fact of experience as old as history, as widely spread as is the human race, and more intensely, irresistibly, importunately real than all the gathered experience of art and policy and science, - the fact which philosophers call moral evil, and Christians sin. It rests upon no questionable interpretation of an Eastern allegory. We breathe it, we commit it, we feel it, we see its havoc all around us. It is no dogma, but a sad, solemn inevitable fact....Philosophers have from time to time attempted to explain this dark experience away, and here and there men of happy temperament, living among calm surroundings have been comparatively unconscious of the evil in the world. But the common conscience

is alike unaffected by the ingenuity of the one class, or the apathy of the other; while it thrills to the voices of men like St. Paul or St. Augustine, Dante or John Bunyan, Loyola or Luther; recognizing in their sighs and tears and lamentations, the echo of its own unutterable sorrow made articulate... And moral evil, independently of any theory of its nature or its origin, is a plain palpable fact, and a fact of such stupendous magnitude as to constitute by far the most serious problem of our life." *1 This statement concerning the "common conscience" does not necessarily contradict the statements I have made concerning the lack of a sense of sin in the "popular mind"; the former is more basic, more unaffected by the fancies of the moment than is the latter.

2. Trend of modern theories of sin.

In the modern theories of sin there is a change from the theocentric, objective, authoritative, to the anthropocentric, experimental, and relative. There is a reaction against court terms, against the over-depreciation of man; there is a new emphasis on the likeness of man to God. There is the introduction of development and evolution as against providential intervention, rational as against non-rational, naturalism as against supernaturalism, socialism as against individualism. One of the greatest influences in the field

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*1. The Fact of Sin. Catholic World. April, 1929

of morals today is the influence of science toward determinism. It is constructing an unbroken chain of cause and effect which seems to eliminate God and to give personality merely secondary value in a world of matter.

Ralph W. Sockman has recently written three articles on sin and morals. The first of these is The Vanishing Sinner and is worthwhile quoting. *1 "The traditional terminology of the Church in this matter of sin has been a court-room vocabulary" and the court room scene is no longer part of the modern world view. "In the first place, the idea of God as a Judge sitting to sentence individual miscreants is difficult to grasp in the universe of immeasurable spaces and innumerable suns." "A second obstacle in securing modern convictions of sin is the seeming uncertainty of the divine laws which the sinner is accused of violating....When he regards moral codes as man-made, the legalist can be convicted of unconventionality, but not of sin." "The modern mind is lacking also in its labelled exhibits of sin"; insanity, epilepsy, earthquakes and floods "were interpreted as divine punishment for perversity." Now the examples of sin are not so concrete. There is a lessening in the passion and volume of the denunciation of sin. The "new insights of biology, psychology, and sociology have lifted the subject of sin out of the atmosphere of personal guilt into the objectivity of social and statistical science....As Hocking

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*1 Harper's November 1930

of Harvard puts it, 'The sense of sin, which is at home in the solitude of individual conscience can hardly survive in the universalizing atmosphere.'"

(a) Schleiermacherian influence - One of the most significant contributions to the doctrine of sin is that made by Schleiermacher, i.e. the introduction of the experimental method. He said that one cannot know what sin is until one has investigated the faculty which reveals it (God consciousness) and the experience of redemption. This psychological study of religion is the beginning of modern theology and religious science. The other contribution which Schleiermacher made was to point out more clearly the social character of sin; it is"in each the work of all, and in all the work of each."*1 So closely allied to Schleiermacher that I will put them together is Albrecht Ritschl. He has made two contributions to the doctrine of sin also: (1) He explained more clearly the social solidarity of sin; (2) He said that sin is due in large measure to ignorance. ~~*1~~

There are then three elements in the influence of Schleiermacher and Ritschl:

(1) The nature of sin must be determined by our experience of sin and redemption, not by theological abstractions; we must begin with ourselves and our religious and moral nature.

(2) Sin is social, it is a network of evil in which we

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*1. Schleiermacher, The Christian Faith. page 288

are all involved, it is "in each the work of all and in all the work of each." This social solidarity takes the place of the old doctrine of original sin; the individual is so closely bound to society that he almost invaribly absorbs the evil in society to some degree and in turn makes his contribution to social sin. This is one of the most significant characteristics of the modern attitude on the nature of sin. Ritschl pictures the Kingdom of Sin versus the Kingdom of God.

(3) Sin is due in large measure to ignorance. Ritschl emphasized this until one is almost tempted to think he made sin nothing but ignorance. At any rate, since there is some measure of ignorance present, forgiveness is more natural and man can more easily separate himself from sin.

(b) Evolutionary influence - There has been nothing more revolutionary than evolutionary thought, be it theistic or mechanistic. The greatest representatives of evolution are Darwin, Spencer, and Hegel; none of these left an adequate place for sin. Only an evolution which regards personality as a creation of the Infinite Person can adequately explain personality; moral never evolved from unmoral, nor spiritual from material. Hegel with his dialectic made sin a necessity and thus made it no sin at all. Spencer reduced ethics to utility; the moral intuitions are the slowly accumulated methods of adaptability acquired by the race. The experiences of utility have become in us certain emotions corresponding

to right and wrong conduct. In these naturalistic theories of evolution "ideals appear as inert by-products of physiology";*[1] in other words, there is really no place for morals.

In theistic theories of evolution morals have a place, but it is a different place from that given them in the older orthodox theory. Man's basic nature, moral self, is the creation of the Supreme Person; the race is modified, developed, advanced, governed, by its own adjustment to its environment and its molding of the environment itself. This is radically different from the older theory of the primal perfection of man and the fall; yet it seems to me that it must allow for a fall of its own, for there must have been a time when man came to be moral as distinguished from what he had been, unmoral. At that moment when he became moral, or at some time later, man knew the better, but did the worse. No matter how many stages of evolution, no matter how fine the distinction, there must have been a time when there was a passing from the non-moral to the moral; that state of morality corresponds to the Biblical teaching of original perfection, and the first sin after that state of morality was reached corresponds to the Biblical Fall. Practically, however, there is a great difference between evolution and the older orthodoxy.

*1. (Wm. James. Pragmatism. page16) Present Tendencies. p. 47

Evolution has shown the relativity of standards and the continuity of history. It has shown some things hitherto considered inviolable to be superficial; it has adopted new modes of thought, accepted new contributions of a divinely ordered process instead of rejecting them as perversions from the truth; it has analyzed the march of history through time and has rationally selected the dynamic, eternal principles and rejected the static and temporal. It has accounted for much of sin by indicating, physiological, psychological, or social causes; this has been of invaluable service. But it has sometimes explained sin and morals away; and when morals have been dismissed the meaning of life is gone.

(c) Rationalistic influence - Rationalism is the antithesis of Authoritarianism and Traditionalism. It is fundamentally critical and inductive; it is empirical; it establishes reason as the highest court of appeals. When carried to the extreme, Intellectualism, it is not favorable to religion; as in the 18th century practically all sense of sin was lost. When it is balanced by experience and a consideration for all the facts, aesthetic, intellectual, moral, and religious, it is one of the most valuable friends of truth and religion. Error alone need fear reason. Rationalism has emancipated the individual and society from the blight of circumscribed, dictated modes of thought. The twentieth

century owes its glory to this emancipation of some two centuries ago. Rationalism has rejected the over-depreciation of man and has declared the likeness of man to God. It has repudiated the highly speculative intellectualism of the middle ages and allied itself with the scientific, evolutionary, and empirical trend.

(d) Scientific influence - Scientific criticism is the term which describes this age more completely than any other. It has revolutionized philosophy, theology, ethics, religion and every field of learning. It has overstepped the mark sometimes and has offered itself as a substitute for religion. Science is just an instrument and may be either good or bad; back of it must be ethical principles and religious hopes or it is barren beyond measure.*1 The field of science is phenomena; consequently, when made a philosophy or religion it is the extreme of Naturalism and Positivism.

There have been three practical, though not necessary, effects of the emphasis on science*2:

1. Science has encouraged Materialism and Positivism and has tended to eliminate God from human thought. This has resulted because science has not been limited to phenomenal and philosophy to metaphysical reality.

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*1. Dean Knudson. Lectures in Pres. Tendencies.
*2. Ibid.

2. Science has tended to dethrone man from his central place in the universe. The vastness of the universe and the ruthlessness of law have made man shrink into nothingness.

3. It has tended to transform nature into a self-running mechanism. Every natural explanation given for the phenomena of life has seemingly denied man metaphysical freedom just that much.

There is no need for theology to fear science when it is restricted to phenomena. It is then one of its greatest servants.

3. Advantages and perils of such a trend.

The trend of theology in general and the doctrine of sin in particular has been toward Naturalism. The advantages of this trend are: (1) It has abolished authoritarianism and Traditionalism; (2) It has substituted naturalism for much supernaturalism, rational for irrational; (3) It has established intellectually respectable evolution and scientific criticism; (4) It has given the personality of man a determinative place in the universe and has humanized theology.

This trend has all the dangers of Naturalism if it goes to the extreme. It really eliminates morality and personality, finite and infinite, from the universe. It loses its appreciation for the individual and for Christ. It casts itself headlong into Mechanism, Determinism, and a dark abyss of pessimism. Of course the place which Schleiermacher gives to the personality of man, particularly the religious nature, is one thing that holds modern science from

naturalism. It is one of God's providences that Individualism arose with science; the one aids and counteracts the other.

B. Fundamental problems involved in a theory of sin.

"All crimes," says Hobbes in A Dialogue of the Common Laws, "are indeed sins, but not all sins crimes. A sin may be in the thought or secret purpose of a man, of which neither a judge, nor a witness, nor any man can take notice."[*1]

For an adequate understanding of the problem of sin one must have a background of ethics. There are some who would identify the sense of sin with embarassment, lack of psychological balance and such like. Like the magician, ethicists generally get out of the hat what they put in it. If one is the crassest kind of utilitarian, sin is weakness, is ineffective production. If one is a Humanist, sin is an ancient superstition. If one is a theistic personalist, sin is a profound moral and spiritual problem. One may recognize and decry sin practically and not recognize it theoretically. But a theory of ethics is essential to a theory of sin.

Ethics is popularly understood as having to do directly and exclusively with my relations to my fellowmen; sin is popularly understood as having to do directly and exclusively with my relations to God. Both these definitions

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[*1] Sin:(Christian) by H. R. Mackintosh;
Hastings' Encyclopaedia of R. and E. Vol. XI page 546

are merely relative. Ethics include all of my moral life with my relations to myself, to my fellows, and to God; and sin is anything which is unethical. Thus strictly speaking there is no distinction between sin and immorality. To any one who wishes to reserve the term sin strictly for offenses against God, I have this to say: in the moral order with God as its supreme head no one can commit an offense against God without committing an offense against the whole moral order.

Futhermore no one can commit an offense against his fellow creatures without offending God. Thus the man who is irreligious is an immoral person, and the man who is immoral is not religious in the true sense of the term. Because of this inter-relatedness of the moral order, I prefer to identify sin and immorality, understanding them both as violation of my moral nature. This identification recognizes the religious character of the term "sin" as it is generally used. At the same time it unifies the moral order by indicating that man owes it to his fellows to be in right relationship to God. If this identification of sin and immorality is rightly understood, religion takes on a rigorous moral complexion and morality becomes definitely personal and religious. While there is a difference in kind between one's duty to God and one's duty to man-the one is the love of created for Creator, the other is the love of created for fellow creature--yet the two are essentially connected and are ethically the same.

There is a very vital connection between metaphysics and ethics. "There may be a practical morality or even a more or less scientific attempt to analyze and formulate a system of ethics without metaphysics, but a purely ethical science which attempts to avoid metaphysics must correspond very imperfectly with our idea of philosophy. A sound science of morality implies a sound metaphysics."*[1] Some systems of metaphysics can allow for no real morality. One of these is Materialism: matter fills out the entire category of being; mind is just an epiphenomenon, a byproduct of the nervous system; the brain secretes thought like the liver secretes bile. Pantheism or Absolutism, if at all consistent, has no place for morality or freedom; finite selves are merely phenomenal, they are not real. Naturalism is generally as exclusive of morality as Materialism is, though the higher Naturalism provides for a sort of morality. Agnosticism, when it is thorough-going, makes morality improbable. Idealism, or Personalism, is the only system which adequately answers the demands of morality; at least it answers them far more satisfactorily than any other.

Without delving into metaphysics, we will accept Personalism and turn to find our bearings in the realm of ethics. There are four or five great schools of ethics which

*1.

I will consider: Psychological Hedonism, Universal Hedonism or Rationalistic Utilitarianism, Intuitionism, Philosophical Intuitionism, and Ideal Utilitarianism. There is neither time nor need to develop these extensively, since Hasting Rashdall's Theory of Good and Evil and other such books give volumes to them. Psychological Hedonism says that actions are right or wrong according as they do or do not tend to produce maximum pleasure; it is based on the psychological theory that nothing can be desired except pleasure. This is contrary to experience: we know of acts of self-sacrifice which positively do not have pleasure as their sole motive. Some one has said that no poor wretched man would consent to be changed into a monkey or a pig even if all his monkey and pig desires would be satisfied. Why? Because there is a qualitative difference between pleasures; as soon as quality is mentioned something other than pleasure is involved. Universal Hedonism is an attempt to introduce altruism into Psychological Hedonism; it is a higher type of ethics, but it falls into the same difficulty. It must recognize some qualitative distinctions in pleasure and as soon as it does it introduces some other standard such as aesthetics or intellect. Intuitionism says that actions are right or wrong without reference to consequences; it holds that intuition or conscience, an internal moral judgement, pronounces not only on principles, but also

on particular incidents, and this aside from experience and aside from consequences. Philosophical Intuitionism avoids the difficulty of particularism, but it does not have a regard for consequences. The greatest representative of this school is, of course, Immanuel Kant. We agree with the Intuitionists in recognizing that there is that which is morally right, per se, intrinsically. When asked how we know these things are good, we have to answer that we know instinctively that they are good. But we object when the Intuitionists say that principles and details are given without reflection or without regard to consequences.

Ideal Utilitarianism, which is much the same as ~~p~~ perfectionism, combines the utilitarian principle with a non-hedonistic view of the ethical objective. Actions are right or wrong insofar as they tend to produce for all mankind an ideal goal which includes but is not limited to pleasure. That goal is made up far more of virtue, than of pleasure; it is a hierarchy of values, ranging from intrinsic to instrumental values; the crown and key of that goal is personality. "They (beautiful characters) are the only phenomenon offered to our sight which justifies the tears of things.....No man standing free and sober and disillusioned ever said to a work of art, The whole sad earth you justify.
I repeat: it is only an achievement in human form which can

wring that cry from us. No other beauty is vital and valid enough." *1

My procedure has been swift and I have taken some long steps, many of which would be questioned by Positivists and Materialists. But my purpose is just to state my ethical system. Having done so briefly, I have determined quite definitely some of the basic truths concerning sin.

1. Definition.

One of the most essential problems is the definition of sin, for with the definition many useless arguments are settled. There has been a lack of penetrating criticism and carelessness in the use of terms. Yet it is a difficult thing to define sin for a complete definition of sin is a theory of sin.

Sin is that which tends not to produce, or does not tend to produce, for all mankind, the complex goal which includes virtue and happiness, a hierarchy of values, the key of which is personality. This is a broad definition; there are some distinctions which must be made. There is a distinction between falling short of the ideal and personal demerit; this distinction is not so hard and fast as it would be if the ethical ideal were static instead of relative, but it is nevertheless real. Every individual is much less successful than he might be in bringing mankind to that ideal goal, but

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*1. Salvation by Intuition - The Yale Review. Winter 1931 p. 270

he is guilty only insofar as he has knowingly opposed its progress or withheld his support. The race is not what it should be. It is shamefully what it ought not to be, and the moral blame-worthiness of the race is crushing; it is "in each the work of all and in all the work of each." Yet the race, the collective group of individuals, is guilty only insofar as wills have intelligently done wrong. The sense of imperfection always comes with a consciousness of God's perfection. As Isaiah said, "Woe is me! for I am undone; because I am a man of unclean lips, and I dwell in the midst of a people of unclean lips: for mine eyes have seen the King, the Lord of hosts."*1 There are at least three elements in this, the guilt of the individual, the guilt of the race or of society, and the imperfection of the finite.

There is also a distinction between actual sin and the sense of sin; the two ought to correspond but they do not always do so. Most people do not think deeply concerning moral problems; they accept the dictates of society and the teachings of the church. After that they judge right and wrong merely by the sense of sin, their feeling concerning particular acts. This "feeling" is the practical standard, and generally it is according to this standard that men are guilty or not guilty. But there must be some objective standard which it is the duty of men to learn; that is, men should

*1. Isaiah 6:5

not only respond to what they believe is right and good, but should also seek to know more truly what is right and good.

Then there is the distinction between sin and immorality; the one is religious and the other ethical. For the theist I believe this distinction is just a practical one; for the atheist it means nothing, since religion is non-existent.

2. Freedom of the will.

Determinism allows for no morality; it is all mere seeming. Indeterminism is inadequate because it does not have any regard for the individual or social effect of sin. "The falsest of all heresies is Pelagianism; if life is built on atomic lines, nothing like religion or morality is thinkable,"[*1] says H. R. Mackintosh of this species of Indeterminism. Self-determinism alone explains the profound character of morality and sin; it recognizes that without the intelligent free choice of the agent there can be no morality, and at the same time it recognizes the determining power of heredity, of environment, and of previous choice. Calvinism proposes that there is ethical responsibility without freedom. But we cannot conceive of there being any morality if finite spirits are not free agents.

[*1] Sin: Hastings' Encyclopaedia of R. and E. 538 - 543 Vol. XI (Christian) by H. R. Mackintosh

3. Sin and guilt.

Sometimes the ancients mercilessly refused to recognize degrees of guilt. They did not give much attention to the determinative factors in conduct, i.e. heredity, environment, and ignorance. Jonathan was condemned to death by his own father because he had ignorantly disobeyed a proclamation and had tasted a little honey.*1 Law was an objective fixed requirement with not enough regard for the subjective elements.

Today the pendulum has swung to the opposite extreme. Morals are democratic, the production of society, not divinely given. Since the Lord Jesus Christ spoke, emphasis has been placed upon the heart, the will, the purpose, rather than on correspondence with an objective standard. Social science and psycho-analysis have shown so convincingly the large place that heredity and environment play, have produced so many natural causes for moral evil, that it seems wrong to call a man guilty. Babies should not be spanked; criminals should not be punished; sinners should not be condemned -- they should be sent to mental clinics.

Elton Mayo in a psychological treatment says: "Studies such as these take the investigation of Sin completely out of the realm of moral disquisition in which the nineteenth century placed it. Sin, spelled with a capital letter,

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*1. I Samuel 14

is a morbid mental trait, it is symptomatic of obsession in however slight a degree. For so long as the morbid situation persists, the individual's mental development is cramped and hindered; he has difficulty in fixing his attention, his life deteriorates into compulsive repetitions which are designed to prevent the emergence into action of the desire formulated in revery." *1

No one can have any objection to a rational, scientific study of the mind, mental disorders, the development of the personality and character. Many things that used to be regarded as devilish dispositions have proved to be nothing but sad mental disorders. The only reasonable way to remedy the evils of society is to determine the nature of the evil and then to apply the remedy. Some evils will be remedied by sanitation, some by police force, some by scientific instruction, some by practical training. There are practical reasons for many of the disorders of life, but neither experience nor morality will permit the complete negation of the existence of great moral evil in the world. To deny that finite wills are deliberately sinful and depraved is to close one's eyes to one of the most apparent facts of society and to abolish all ethical values.

Ignorance is one of the problems that affect the guilt of sin. Socrates said that to know good is to do good.

*1. Sin With a Capital "S" - Harper's April 1927

Some one more modern says that to know all is to forgive all. Ritschl says that all forgivable sin is in God's eyes sin of ignorance; this implies that there is no sin but ignorance or that any knowing sin is unforgivable. Ritschl probably just meant to indicate the large place which ignorance plays in sin. W.E. Orchard says that no sin which is guilty can be forgiven. We rather think that any sin which is not guilty need not be forgiven. Sin is not merely ignorance, though ignorance plays a large part in sin. Guilt is in inverse proportion to ignorance.

"Christian theology must operate with an idea of guilt which is drawn from fully conscious moral experience... Guilt is personal accountability and blameworthiness attaching either to a voluntary infringement of the will of God, in so far as that will is known to us or might have been known except for previous sin, or to a condition of personal life directly or indirectly consequent on such infringements." *[1]

4. Origin.

The Catholic World of April 1929 says: "And moral evil, independently of any theory of its nature or of its origin, is a plain palpable fact, and a fact of such stupendous magnitude as to constitute by far the most serious problem of our life." As important as it is to study the psychological and historical origins of sin and as startling as the

*1. Sin. Hastings' Encyclopaedia of R.&E. Vol. XI 542

discoveries that follow may be, it is utter folly to deny the existence of morality, moral evil, or sin. They are facts of the race and the race's history; they throb in the heart of man and guide the course of society.

)a) Fall -- One of the most well known accounts of the psychological and historical origin of sin is the story in Genesis the third chapter. Today some of the psychological truths of the account of the fall of Adam are accepted, but generally the historicity of the account~~ed~~ is rejected. Dean Knudson says that the important truth of the Fall is that "there is a great contrast between human life as it is and as it ought to be."[*1] Whether or not one recognizes the historicity of the Genesis III account, one must recognize that some time or other there was a historical introduction of sin into the world and that the social effect of sin began at that moment.

The rejection of the Fall is the result of evolutionary thinking which holds that man is growing toward the perfection of maturity rather than that he has fallen from an original perfection of maturity. The basic truth of both theistic evolution and the older orthodox view of the Fall is that man's highest place is in happy moral communion with his fellow man and with God. The next truth which both of them claim is that "there is a great contrast between human life as it is and as it ought to be." The next truth which both of them acknowledge is that moral excellence is not given as

*1. Lectures in Systematic Theology.

an honorary degree, but is won through earnest striving. Adam may have been superbly wise, but what moral praise he had came through resisting temptation and cleaving to the right. These are fundamental truths and cannot be obscured by noisy polemic.

(b) Universality of sin -- I have put this under the the origin of sin because of its association with the Fall of Adam. It is a deduction from the fact that Adam, the first man, the representive of the race, sinned. It is the opinion today that St. Paul meant to indicate Adam simply as the first one to commit sin rather than one who passed directly to every man the moral taint; at any rate Paul was just using the physical unity of the race to illustrate the solidarity of believers in Christ.

Universality of sin is now generally regarded as an induction from experience, not a deduction from the principle that sin passed upon all the race without exception. "Dr. Tennant and Professor Wheeler Robinson, like Ritschl before them, have urged that we ought to treat the affirmation of universality as a generalisation rather than as a law --a thing found true in all the past, but not rigorously predictable."*[1]

The problem is--Does every one have to sin? If ~~a~~ every one has to sin then there is no sin except for Adam,who brought upon the race the necessity of sin; and infinite would be the guilt of Adam. "We do not doubt that it is in the power of every will to make the grand choice, habitually and

*1. Christianity and Sin -- Mackintosh 156

predominantly, of good against evil. Such a choice is possible to all, easy to none. If there is an imperious moral claim on one side--the claim of freedom--there is an unquestionable moral fact on the other side; the fact of the world's sin."[*1] It is possible that an individual upon coming to the age of responsibility can, by adopting the right religious and moral attitude, be enabled by the accepted grace of God to live a sinless life. This is unquestionably so, theoretically. Practically, we know of only one sinless heart and life, the Lord Jesus Christ. This leads to our next problem.

(c) Hereditary depravity or original sin --- Sometimes total depravity is the term used. They are not identical but the three are about the same in significance; the substance of the three is that man is morally depraved and cannot save himself. Dean Knudson has pointed out three senses in which these terms are used; when the distinctions are made there is much less difficulty. They are the religious, the abstract, and the concrete.[1] In the religious sense, which deals with the ideal, we all are wretched and depraved; before the holiness of God only the morally dead can fail to feel so. In the abstract sense, man without God is totally depraved; insofar as man turns from God he is evil, because by rejecting God he is rejecting all that is good in himself and in the universe. In the concrete sense, there is something of God in every man; no man is totally depraved.

[2] Lectures in Systematic Theology.
[1] Ibid. 166

The first two of these terms are generally associated with Adam's sin and often mean that guilt as well as m moral depravity is in every child of the race. The Realistic Theory and the Representative Theory try to rationalize the guilty moral corruption which is said to be in every child. There is no way to place upon innocency the guilt of another; guilt is unalienable.

The truth which is poorly presented by these older terms (at least often misrepresented in them) is given in Schleiermacher's and Ritschl's doctrine of social solidarity. "Modern thought, instead of linking our inborn evil constitution to our first parents, speaks rather of a sinful race or community in whose evil we share, and insists that in this field the idea of inheritance means that we infect those who come after us as well as receive infection from our ancestors. Not only so; it is rightly held that sin spreads in other ways than by heredity, viz. through bad training, unworthy example and tempting provocations. The traditional idea of total depravity, while no doubt indicative of the fact that no part of our nature is unstained and that we cannot of ourselves do what is in the highest sense good, is nevertheless unscriptual and untrue to life if taken to mean that non-Christians are 'utterly indisposed, disabled, and made opposite to all good, and wholly inclined to all evil'."*1

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*1. Sin: Hastings' Encyclopaedia of R. and E. Vol. XI 540

The re-interpretation of total depravity does not reduce sin to the Pelagian interpretation of it. The Christian view is that we need divine help to overcome sin. If sin were no more than individual acts, we are as morally free to choose the good now as if sin never was; we could then save ourselves. "If sin were not super-individual, if man could control sin by his own power, there would be no need of redemption."*2 William Lyon Phelps says: "If we were naturally good we should not need religion. If we were naturally virtuous, industrious and reliable, we should not need restraining and corrective forces..... Humanity needs every elevating influence, and the most elevating influence in the world is the Christian religion. We need to be saved not once, but every day, because nobody is safe.....In the eternal warfare between reason and instinct, between unselfishness and selfishness, the enemy is not on the outside, nor is there any remote or unusual danger to be feared. The enemy is encamped within, in the heart of the citadel; we are in danger all the time." *1

The depravity of man does not mean that man is naturally, normally evil. The Catholic teaching is that the natural man, man as created, is evil; and that original perfection was something given to man by God, a gift, something that did not belong to man; and that when Adam sinned the gift of perfection was taken away and man was left with his

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*1. The Ladies Home Journal. May 1925

*2. Lectures in Sys. Theol.

own faculties. The true view is that God gave man a kind of perfection of his own, not as a gift (though all that man has he has received) but as part of his very nature. Man is dependent on God for the highest attainment in personality values; and insofar as he turns from God he is depraved, he is revolting against his own nature and bringing disintegration upon himself. This is not an arbitrary law established by God for the sake of keeping man's attention; it is in the warp and woof of a personalistic universe, of morality, of man's own Nature.

(d) Non-temporal choice -- Julius Müller is one of those who think that it is impossible to reconcile freedom with the force of social depravity. Because of the power of social depravity no finite self has a fair opportunity to choose between good and evil. But to save freedom it is impractical to agree with Pelagianism and state that sin has no permanent effect on character or on society. The only way out of the dilemma is to postulate a pre-temporal or timeless probation and choice. In this timeless choice, unhindered by social sin or depravity, finite selves have torn themselves loose from God and made self the principle.*[1]

I respect Müller's trying to save both freedom and the fact of super-individual sin, but I think that his proposition is inconceivable and too speculative. The Realistic

*1. See Müller's Doctrine of Sin, Vol.II 410f.

Theory of original sin is of much the same character and is, I think, about as satisfactory as a non-temporal choice.

II History of the Doctrine of Sin

This historical sketch is of the Christian view of sin and of course it must of necessity be very brief. It is not much more than an outline to indicate the progress and to give the historical background of the hamartiological problem.

A. In the Old Testament

The earliest ideas of sin in the Old Testament are Pre-Christian and un-ethical; "the earliest doctrine of sin - whether properly or only metaphorically so-called — is associated with certain physical conceptions of divine 'holiness'.. ...It is found in Holy things, persons, and usages, and avenges itself automatically upon the rash intruder."[*1] A forward step is made with the belief that calamity indicates previous transgression.

With the great prophets of the eight century B. C.,

[*1] Christianity and Sin. page 3

Amos, Hosea, Isaiah, and Micah, came the ethicizing of the conception of God and of sin. They identified Jehovah with "the moral principle of the universe"; they condemned ceremonialism, and demanded righteousness and obedience to moral law; they announced an "immanent day of the Lord" when evil should be abolished and God and righteousness should rule.*[1]

There are two or three factors or developments in later Old Testament ha~~r~~martiology. Mackintosh makes three. "First we should mention the reaction in the age of Manasseh towards heathenism of a gloomy type, with a development or revival of terrible rites.....But more important than anything else in Manasseh's age was the tremendous fact of exile. A third great influence was the personality of the priest-prophet Ezekiel."*[2] The last two are the most important. The exile brought a profound sense of national and individual sin and guilt. In the sixth century B. C. it was Ezekiel and Jeremiah who spoke of the subjective character, the internal taint, of sin.

The Old Testament asserts the universality of sin (Psalms 14, Proverbs 20:9). It does not develop any formal doctrine of the origin of sin, but explains sins according to individual cases; the Fall does not seem to be regarded as essential for the understanding of sin. The relation

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*1. Doctrine of God. page 327
*2. Christianity and Sin. page 29

between sin and suffering, particularly death, is a constant problem. Deuteronomy 30, Ezekiel 18, Psalms 1, and others suggest that man's external circumstances correspond to his goodness. That is one of the central problems in the Book of Job, but Job finally repudiates the idea that the good man always prospers materially.

B. In the New Testament.

Between the Old Testament and the New comes a period of Judaism when there is a more elaborate development of the theory of sin. It is a period of Pharisaism, of legalism, a period when there is a lack of spiritual fervor and an abundance of religious speculation; yet it was here that many of the doctrines later accepted by Christianity originated. It is enough to say that "the theology of Judaism sums up consistently in favour of freewill and the possibility of self-salvation."*[1] The Jewish literature of the 1st. century, B.C. and A.D., takes a somber view of man; it speaks of "universal corruption." "Though sin may be inherited, moral freedom is intact, and man can choose whether he will or will not live righteously.....The heart, not the flesh, is the seat of the inborn evil impulse (yezer hara); but at least the flesh makes sin intelligible, and, as Holtzman put it, 'there is no clear agreement whether the flesh represents a power

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*1. Ibid. Page 54

ethically indifferent or one that somehow leads to sin."*1 Much responsibility for sin belongs to evil spirits. Sin is not put in relation to the love of God; it is rebellion against God as ruler, judge, creditor.

The New Testament has a sublime ethics. Ceremonialism, external form, legalism, are rejected for a rigorous ethical and religious sincerity; it is not every one that sayeth, "Lord, Lord," but he that doeth the will of the Father that is accepted. To the Pharisaical Jews Jesus says, "Is it lawful to do good on the Sabbath day?" For an external, arbitrary law there is substituted to a certain degree a law which rises from the demands of man's own nature -- the Sabbath is made for man, not man for the Sabbath. There is a profound recognition of the subjective character of sin; the theme of the Sermon on the Mount is,- the law condemns or praises acts, the Gospel condemns or praises even the thoughts and intents of the heart. The one outstanding contribution of the New Testament is that sin is not the violation of the law of God as much as it is the rejection of the self-sacrificing love of God. Coordinate with this, even greater than this, is the truth of forgiveness. "The cardinal truth about sin is that it can be so forgiven as to be replaced by Christian goodness, and that in His Son the Father has interposed to put it away by the sacrifice of Himself."*2

*1. Sin: Hastings' Encyclopaedia of R. and E. Vol. XI 538f
*2. Ibid.

Jesus does not have a general doctrine of sin; He deals with concrete sins, not with abstract considerations creating an intellectual problem. Sin is a terrible fact, committed against God as against our fellow man. Sin is religious as well as ethical; all have sinned and come short. The heart is the source of sin. Sin is guilty and must be forgiven. It is terrible; even the disciples need God's continued mercy (Matt. 6:12; 18:23).

The doctrine of sin in the Johannine writings has been said to be accidental or secondary.*[1] But John has a keen appreciation of the character of sin; for him sin is closely associated with disbelief in Christ and the rejection of the light He brought. St. Paul has been the storm center of the New Testament. Sin is universal and is what opposes the will of God as made known by the written law and by the law written in every man's heart. St. Paul has two outstanding principles concerning the power of sin: the first is the unity of the race and its connection with the sin of Adam (but this does not necessarily teach that the race is cursed merely for Adam's sin); the second principle is "that the flesh is radically antagonistic to God: as has been said, it represents for St. Paul 'the virulence and constitutional character as well as the omnipresence of sin'.....We must then believe that to St. Paul the flesh is a power productive of sin not because it is sin, but because sin, seated in the flesh as an

*1. Ibid.

alien power, utilizes it as organ and instrument. Till Christ came, the empirically sinful fleshly principle ruled; ever since, the counteractive Spirit has been victoriously on the ground."[*1]

C. Early and Medieval View.

The early Church did not have a developed conception of sin. Not that it was not interested in the practical problem, for it was. Lapse into grave sin, particularly idolatry , adultery, or murder, forfeited salvation; but generally sins were remitted by baptism. In general the Eastern Church was interested in a mystical redemption, the Western in justification and forgiveness.

The high peak in medieval ha~~r~~martiology is the Pelagian controversy; the church finally agreed with Augustine but for some centuries it compromised between the two. In opposition to the Manichaeans Augustine insisted on the voluntary nature of sin, yet against Pelagius he maintained that sin was a ~~p~~ pitiful necessity. "As a psychological indeterminist Augustine conceded that man may freely prefer a less evil to a greater; as a theological necessitarian he denied that without grace any right act is possible....Not merely particular acts, but the nature, disposition and affections of man are sinful and guilty throughout, incapable of any good."[*2] Robert Mackintosh traces four motives in Augustine's doctrine of sin and salvation. First,"there is the ha~~r~~martiological

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*1. Ibid.
*2. Ibid.

motive proper, given in a dread personal experience of helpless guilt." Secondly, there is the experience of the healing touch of divine grace; this blends evangelism with predestinarianism or the absolute supremacy of God. Thirdly, there are speculative or philosophical elements, and fourthly, there is the sacramental motive.*1 This last is illustrated by the appeal to the practise of infant baptism.

Pelagius contended that sin consists of individual acts only and leaves the will and nature unaffected; that children are born sinless, that universality of sin (if a fact) is due to bad example or defective education, that divine grace is requisite only in the form of instruction and of the example of Christ.

Augustine defined sin negatively; it is a privatio boni. At the bottom it is pride, and the form which the perverted will takes in every man is concupiscence or lust. Men are born not merely sinful, but guilty and meriting eternal damnation.

In the following centuries emphasis changed from act to disposition; mortal sin became love of the creature instead of God. Anselm made an advancement by showing indisputably the guilt of sin. It was still somewhat negative, however. ~~sin is what we have lost in comparison to Adam, though materially it is concupiscence.~~

*1. Christianity and Sin. 102f

The outline of the sin doctrine was clarified during this early period. There are at least five distinct points. First, St. Paul's sinful humanity has becomed totally depraved; if Christ and the Church are necessary then there can be absolutely nothing good outside of them. Secondly, there are clearer ideas about Adam and free will. Thirdly, there is a definitely taught transmission of sin from Adam, i.e. guilty corruption, connected with biological reproduction and removable by baptism. Fourthly, the remedy for sin is sacramental; baptism is administered to infants as well as to adults. Fifthly, "Augustine definitely teaches the possibility of lapsing from a state of grace."*1

D. Doctrine of the Reformation.

The Reformers strove "to accentuate the religious and personal character of sin as interpreted by the light of revelation."*2 Sin is the want of faith, the failure to fear and love and trust God; Luther almost identifies it with the "faithless heart." The idea of inherited guilt was still generally accepted and the reconciliation of inherited guilt with the new sense of responsibility was not yet made clear. Zwingli was about the only one to say that one can only speak of sin when the individual has appropriated the consequences of sin. The penalty of sin is*3 : (1) mors spiritualis, or

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*1. Ibid. 103f.
*2. Sin: Hastings'. Vol. XI 540
*3. Ibid.

the loss of the divine image; (2) mors corporalis, including sickness and outward evils as well as death; (3) mors aeterna, or exclusion from everlasting life with God. There was a neglect of the social power of sin due to the emphasis on Adam's sin and its consequences.

Luther is a great soul who, like Augustine, by his own heart's conflicts introduced a new element of evangelicalism into the church. Justification by faith and the rejection of sacramentarianism are the distinctive features of Luther. The Lutheran Church soon dropped predestinarianism. It is Calvinism that preserves the purest orthodox theology. It emphasizes the guilt of sin even while holding to the predestinarianism, to immediate imputation of Adam's sin, and to salvation by faith; this inconsistency was accepted as one of the theological antinomies. One of the problems which arose in Calvinism was the question whether God appointed men to salvation or damnation independently of Adam's fall (supralapsarianism), or, by way of punishment and redemption, as a consequence of Adam's sin (infralapsarianism); this indicates the type of thought in the church at that time."*[1] Then came Jonathan Edwards who reduced Calvinism to a basis of philosophical determinism. Mackintosh says that by this time we have passed the historical watershed. "The tide of logical inference had risen to its fullest in the Protestant scholasticism, threat-

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*1. Christianity and Sin. 106f.

ening to drown out the faith and the life it was meant to serve. Since then it has receded and is still going back."[1] And Arminianism was the beginning of that recession.

E. Post Reformation Views.

The greatest names in the history of the doctrine of sin in modern times are Immanuel Kant, Schleiermacher, Ritschl, Julius Müller, and F. R. Tennant. Tennant's "Origin and Propagation of Sin", the Hulsean lectures for 1901-2, is the first work in English to accept the theory of evolution. W. E. Orchard says in his Modern Theories of sin that there has not been an exhaustive treatment of the subject since Müller's monograph in 1851. There probably is a reason. All philosophy, theology and ethics particularly, have been undergoing a marked revolution in the last century; when everything is in flux and flow no one will attempt to do an exhaustive piece of work. The modern age is not ready to state its complete opinion concerning sin, particularly since so many doubt whether there be any such thing as sin.

18th century Rationalism with its evolutionary bent taught that man could develop the good germ that was in him and, crushing out the tiger and the ape, eventually rise above desire into Liberty. Kant substituted for original sin a philosophical analogue — "that radical evil in man as man, the timeless origin of which is symbolized by the Biblical

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[1] Ibid.

story of the Fall."*[1] Schelling "gives his own philosophical form to the antinomies of tradition, holding that, in spite of a universal necessity rooted in the dark bases of God, evil is man's choice, and every creature falls by its own guilt."*[2] To Hegel the Fall is a mythological representation of a necessary process. Man, good by nature, must reach virtue by passing from innocence through sin. Innocence, which is absence of will, is weak; in exerting his will man sins; to pass from sin to virtue is a process of retribution and amendment. This makes sin a necessary element of or in virtue. Schleiermacher says that according to God's ordinance man's sensuous development has gotten ahead of his spiritual development. Sin is the positive struggle of the former against the latter. He vacillates between the opinion that sin is non-existent for God and that it is caused by Him. Sin is a social fact. With Julius Müller sin is selfishness; finite selves have not so much pre-temporally as timelessly torn themselves loose from God and made self the principle of life. Ritschl's interpretation of sin is religious, it is opposition to the Kingdom of God. He indicates the social character of sin and gives large place to the element of ignorance. F. R. Tennant demands a plurality of developmental concepts of sin. Sin is different from imperfection; only wilful acts can be sin, for sin and guilt are correlative. He explains the origin of sin

*1. Sin: Hastings' Vol. XI 540
*2. Ibid.

in the individual life by saying that the natural, organic propensities provide the raw material out of which the will constructs. "Man is conscious before he is self-conscious, impulsively appetitive before he is volitional, and volitional before he is moral."*1

There are numerous others who make more or less successful attempts to treat the doctrine of sin. Tullock and H.S.V. Eck are two of the older theologians; Robert Mackintosh and W.E. Orchard are two recent writers. There would probably be many more valuable treatises on this subject if this age was a little more theologically minded.

*1 Concept of Sin. 155

III Current Theories

A. Necessitarian

The Theories of sin first break into the two large classes, freedomistic and necessitarian. There is a tendency for these two to drift together; the former does not lean too far toward Pelagius, because it has an appreciation of the social character of sin; the latter, while it regards sin as a necessity, yet tries to retain freedom. Most of the men in the former recognize the universality of sin and Schleiermacher really says that sin is a necessity; most of those in the latter class proceed as though man were free and responsible. And yet, despite these variations, I think there stands a gulf between them.

There are three types under the freedomistic theories. Schleiermacher and Ritschl state very clearly that method in theology is the religious. The former starts with the religious nature and with the sense of absolute dependence; he calls this the God-consciousness and confines doctrines to the limits of Christian experience. The latter adopts the same method but the touchstone of his theology is the Christian experience of justification and reconciliation. Tennant

and Pfleiderer have greater freedom from traditional teaching; they construct their theories of sin from a critical study of experience and do not allow the Christian consciousness such an authoritative place. It is this method of approach that is most generally used today. I have called the last group the logical theories. Kant and Müller are both of the older intellectualistic school, moved by the impulse to theorize with not a great regard for experience. Because of his stress on the good will Kant is very important in ethics and in a theory of sin. Julius Müller's masterful work is the last great monograph on the subject, says Orchard; but neither of them ~~are~~ is empirical enough.

1. Hegel --- Orchard and Mc Taggart both remark that Hegel's doctrine of sin is complicated by the different points of view and that it is only to be found scattered through his writings. Hegel has adopted a logical formula which he tries to apply to the Christian consciousness. Sometimes he makes concessions to experience which threaten to ruin his dialectic. Sometimes it is doubtful whether he is talking of the individual or of the race. In general, his system revolves around the dialectic: Innocence (Thesis), Sin (Antithesis), Virtue (Synthesis). There is something in Innocence that produces Sin; Sin produces Retribution, Amendment and finally Virtue.

McTaggart gives two points which I am not so sure can be proved. "In the first place the triad of Innocence, Sin and Virtue is put forward by Hegel as the sufficient

explanation of Sin, but not as the sufficient explanation of Virtue. Sin never occurs except as the Antithesis of such a triad, but Virtue....can occur in other circumstances, and not only as the Synthesis of Innocence and Sin. In the second place, Hegel does not commit himself to the statement that, wherever Innocence is found, the other terms must follow, but only says that there is something in the nature of each term which tends to bring on its successor."*1

Man is innocent, neither bad nor good until he asserts his will and thus becomes individual or sinful. Hegel says that the "good man is good along with and by means of his will, and to that extent because of his guilt. Innocence implies the absence of will, the absence of evil and consequently the absence of goodness....; in so far as he is good, it must be by the action and consent of his will."*2 "Evil is first present within the sphere of knowledge; it is the consciousness of independent Being, or Being-for -self relatively to an Other, but also relatively to an Object which is inherently universal in the sense that it is Notion, or rational will. It is only by means of this separation that I exist independently, for myself, and it is in this that evil lies. To be evil means in an abstract sense, to isolate myself; the isolation which separates me from the Universal represents the element of rationality, the laws, the essential characteristics of Spirit. But it is along with this separation that

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*1. Studies in Hegelian Cosmology 153
*2. Ibid. 154

that Being-for self originates, and it is only when it appears that we have the Spiritual as something universal, as law, what ought to be."*1

It seems to me that McTaggart cannot defend his two statements mentioned above. Hegel makes sin a necessity without equivocation. He says that the state of innocence is evil because it lacks will, the only thing that can be good or evil. Then he says that the only mode of procedure from innocence is to assert self in opposition to the whole, individuality in opposition to universality. Then reconciliation and virtue are found by elimination of the opposition. If he had made it possible to move from innocence ~~from~~ by any other way than by asserting the principle of self in opposition to the universal, he would have been acceptable; but he did not. Sin is better than innocence because it is an assertion of that which is worthwhile and is a step toward virtue. It is not the final state, but it is a necessary state and is a move toward virtue; so that sin is really virtue, a stage or a part of it.

Whatever is devoid of will is in harmony with the universe; the only thing that can exist out of harmony with the universe is will. The harmony of wills is intrinsically of more value than any other harmony. Thus it is an evil to remain in innocence. But the first step in the direction of

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*1. Quoted in Orchard 67.

virtue is the assertion of self as such. When self learns that this state is an evil, it harmonizes itself with the universal and thus finds virtue.

As it is stated, there is no recognition of moral evil in this system. It is nothing more than the self seeking for expression in its highest form. Hegel says it is a necessary process, and it seems to be a wise, desirable progression from innocence to virtue. Instead of using the term sin, which to say the least has a bad connotation, I would use the term growth, or expansion, or progress. The only ~~p~~ place for moral evil that I can see in the system (and Hegel does not designate this as the only sin) is in the refusal of self, after having felt the obligation to ally itself with the universal, to do so. If that is what Hegel meant by sin, i.e. the refusal to progress after having seen the obligation to do so or the deliberate turning from the universal to the principle of self, then I will accept his explanation of sin. As he has stated it, it is too artificial. On the other hand, if he makes deliberate wrong-doing a necessity, as he does in different places, then he is contradicting himself; universal necessary deliberate wrong-doing is a sheer paradox, such sin is no sin at all.

When he forgets his system Hegel shows that he recognizes, practically, the facts of sin, guilt, and repentance. Sin, which is seeking that which never satisfies, must in the

long run always disgust the person who commits it. Thus Sin produces Retribution or Punishment, which in turn produces Amendment; Amendment comes when the self realizes that in sin it is not finding its highest place, and it in turn produces Virtue. Hegel says that once Virtue is reached particular imperfections are not removed by first emphasizing the complementary imperfection, and then rising to the point above them both; the point above (virtue) may be reached by rising directly from the imperfection. Thus the triangle may become more and more like a straight line, though never quite that. This allowance for a way to rise from a particular thesis to a synthesis without the antithesis, does not remove the necessity of sin from his system. It really introduces an inconsistency.

McTaggart tries to justify Hegel by saying that all "that is required of a theory of Sin....in order that it may be harmless to morality, is that it should not deny the difference between Virtue and Sin, or assert that Sin is the greater good of the two. Hegel's theory does not do either. To go farther, and to condemn Sin as absolutely and positively bad, is useless to morality and fatal to religion."[*1]

Sin, moral evil in the abstract, IS "absolutely and positively bad"; to say less than that is to assert that Sin is good. Now, if McTaggart means that there are degrees of sin I agree with him; the only person that could be absolutely

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*1. Hegelian Cosmology. 174

bad would be an infinite being absolutely resigned to evil. I do not believe that there is any finite being who is completely bad in his finite way; there can be found some good in everybody. Motives are tremendously complex; I do not believe there is one person or very many acts that are wholly bad. There are probably objective benefits of some kind from most sinful acts. Granting all this and recognizing that there is no sinful motive which probably could not be more sinful, yet we must say that the sinful will is eternally and unequivocally bad. Every choice is between degrees of good; no matter how slight the difference between them, the deliberate choice of the lesser good is sin. The greater the difference between the goods and the more deliberate the choice, the graver is the sin. I recognize that acts and motives pass by almost imperceptible degrees from non-morality to the most apparent morality and I would not reject all relativity, but I will never recognize that deliberate choice of evil is anything but bad. Individual sins are not absolutely bad, but Sin is "absolutely and positively bad."

Hegel says at times*[1] that man is guilty, and he sounds a note of sorrow at the recognition of evil; but there "is certainly a great difference between the way sin is regarded in this theory and the dreadful aspect it wears in the judgement of religion and theology."*[2] Hegel indicates the

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*1. Quoted in Orchard 70
*2. Ibid. 72

progressive character of morality, its evolution in the race and in the individual, but his theory of sin is inadequate for religion and ethics alike. There are some glorious passages in Hegel, but his system as a whole cannot escape this criticism.

2. Spencer-- I have chosen Spencer not because he has made any particular contribution to the theory of sin, but because he represents the naturalistic evolutionists. He resented being called a materialist, but for all practical purposes he was that, and anything that smacked of idealism was imported and necessarily inconsistent. His is a survival ethics; he is a thoroughgoing empiricist. The moral scruples we have are simply the result of years and years of reaction to our environment; those things which were found to insure the survival of the race gradually became habits and today seem to have the force of divinely given commands. It is the crassest kind of Utilitarianism; anything other than utility in it is foreign matter stolen from Christianity.

According to Spencer, and according to all materialists and naturalists who are logical, sin is simply that which does not have survival value. It is the blind intuition of these "survival" teachers that life is worthwhile sustaining. They have no reason to feel that it is. But they advise that course of action that will best insure the survival of the

individual and the race. Nothing is of value except as it does insure said survival. In such a universe the worst sin imaginable would be suicide, since the only good is survival. How ironical such a statement to the suffering millions of earth; were survival all that was involved, suicide would be heaven to the millions who suffer.

According to Spencer the moral sense is a product of evolution. "Its origin is society, its sanction is utility, its criterion is pleasure or fitness to promote the general happiness, its authority is law, custom, religion, public opinion, etc."[*1] This seems to lower ethics tremendously and it does. Spencer has heroically devoted himself to high moral ideals and he merely intended by his system to rationalize and secularize ethics. Undoubtedly there was some need of that; his system is a kind of reaction to Kant's thoroughgoing idealism. But there is no dodging its implications; it may seem to recognize the higher spiritual values but they are made merely secondary values, instrumental in preserving the race. The sense of sin is a shadowy feeling of "ought not", the result of a series of unsuccessful actions and of significance only in the preservation of the greatest quantity of human life.

[*1] Evolutionism and Idealism 47.

3. Schelling -- Schelling's theory of sin is really a species of Manichaeism. His ideas "are speculative to the last degree, and really admit of no confirmation, nor do they seem to have any other necessity to thought than as a refuge of despair."*[1] Whenever a thinker concludes that freedom of choice cannot account for sin, he is sure to weave some highly speculative theory or to carry sin up into the nature of God. There have always been undercurrents in church thought which have tended to regard ultimate reality as dual, good versus evil. The ancient Persians, the Gnostics, the Manichae~~i~~ans and others have seen evil deeply imbedded in ultimate reality. Schleiermacher was driven to believe that God was the cause of sin, though in a different way than He was the cause of redemption.

Schelling begins by noting two principles in all personality, ego and non-ego. Neither of these can be the Absolute since they are dependent. Then the Personal God cannot be the Absolute; the Absolute is the indifference of subjective and objective, and of all contrasts. It is from this dark Basis in God that all beings spring. The conflicting principles are found in man also; in the separability of the principles is the possibility of sin. Because of the nature which man receives from this Basis or opposite in God, man sins; yet he maintains that man is free.

*1. Orchard 60

There is not a great need to criticize this theory. It does nothing to solve the problem of sin: it carries sin up into God, into an irrational "ground"; it obscures the personality both ~~and~~ of God and man; it abolishes the idea of sin as we conceive it and makes the universe a swirl of question marks and shadows. And above all, "the crude theosophizing is entirely uncongenial to the Christian way of thinking of God."*[1]

4. Weisse -- Weisse, just as Schelling does, seeks something beyond the Personal God. "Besides this primitive Reason we must have the Divine Heart which conceives the images of things, and also the Divine Will which freely works upon them, and so begets the nature of God as personality and love. The self-realization of God ia a process in time, preceding the creation of the world."*[2] Matter, the actualisation of the non-ego of God, is the metaphysical necessity of Evil. God cannot immediately abolish the antithesis between His will and evil. "The origination of sin in the creature is, therefore, not to be sought in a conscious act, but is a genesis before time of the personal will out of the natural spontaneity of individual beings."*[3]

There are other necessitarian systems we might mention, but these four are sufficient. The last two are altogether too speculative and mythological for scientific thinking;

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*1. Orchard 63.
*2. Ibid. 63f.
*3. Ibid. 64.

neither do they strike at the heart of the problem. Spencer represents an advance toward empirical and critical thinking even though his utilitarianism is not lofty enough. Hegel presents sin as the falling below the capacities of our nature; he shows insight in that the center of interest for him is the development of the self, but his account of sin is too artificial. None of them have adequately explained the origin or the nature of sin. If sin is a necessity then there is no sin and there are no moral standards. On the other hand, we must ask if freedom of the will is sufficient to account for the possibility of sin, its gravity and universality.

B. Freedomistic

It is needless to say that any system which does not grant the metaphysical freedom of finite beings abolishes all moral distinctions and values. Calvinism has a profound sense of the gravity of sin and, practically, is thoroughly moral; in fact, it is through the desire to recognize the dark character of sin that it denies freedom to man. Hegel and Spencer have little appreciation of sin or morality; the very spirit of their systems is deadly to religion and ethics. Yet despite this great difference of attitude between Calvin and these evolutionists, they both theoretically negate the existence of freedom. Some of the theologians who are to be treated under this second division also come perilously near denying the existence of sin as it is generally understood, that is, the conscious wrong doing of free moral agents; but they all defend the freedom of man and his power of contrary choice.

I have divided this section into three parts, Religious, Empiricistic, and Logical, according to the method of the writers. The first method, that of Schleiermacher and Ritschl, is revolutionary. Till their time theology had been deduction and rationalisation on the basis of Scripture and tradition; there had often been an appeal to experience, but it had been somewhat artificial and limited. Schleiermacher rejected all recognized conclusions of the church and began

investigating the religious nature and Christian consciousness. He did his best to re-accept Christian doctrines and did to quite an extent, but there were some which he rejected. He said that experience is made up of Knowing, Willing, and Feeling; that religion is nothing but pure feeling; that even thinking about said feeling is not religion, but that the theologian would have to accept this debasement of pure feeling as inevitable if he would rationalize religion. Thus with him Christian consciousness, the feeling of absolute dependence, is the only source of theology. Ritschl uses much the same method, but with greater freedom. He says that sin can only be known through the experience of redemption; sin is "the negative presupposition of reconciliation." *1 "The Gospel of the forgiveness of sins is actually the ground of the knowledge of our sinfulness." *2

The Empirical method is the same as the Religious except that it treats experience generally and does not limit itself to the religious consciousness. It is the accepted way of treating sin, or any other subject for that matter, today. The older theologians would investigate experience a little (guarding lest they should find anything new), and then would turn to the Scriptures to corroborate their findings. The new theologians only too gladly cast Scripture and tradition aside and turn to scientific investigation; the more contradictory to Scripture their conclusions, the more delighted they are.

*1. Justification and Reconciliation 327
*2. I bid.

The Logical or rationalistic method is not so modern; it has been displaced by the other two. The one great difficulty with it is that life does not conform to logic; logic must conform to life. The philosopher in his study may spin theories, lay down premises, and draw conclusions, but when he is done he may be farther from the truth than when he began.

I am giving this introduction for the purpose of showing that one cannot restrict oneself to one method and form a satisfactory theory of sin. Theology and ethics are composite in character and must be treated as such. Philosophy, science, religion, and experience all are determinative in a doctrine of sin. Today the world has gone mad, figuratively and literally, over experience, empiricism, positivism. They all have their place, for the anthropological viewpoint and the study of man have gloriously revolutionized, rationalized, and humanized our "Weltanschauung". But experience alone will never form a rational philosophy of life. Religious experience corrorborates, testifies to, the truths of theology; it is determined by them, it does not determine them. Here is the place where Schleiermacher made his error; given a Christian consciousness, he could analyze it, but a Christian consciousness would never have existed if it had not had ~~for~~ its counterpart in logical beliefs. Reject metaphysics and you become a hedonistic utilitarian; confine yourself to logic and you

leave life and practicality. Modern Positivists with their scientific efficiency have dismissed the Creator and sustainer of the universe, and may shortly dismiss some other toys to which we weak mortals cling. On the other hand medieval theologians with apparently no obligation to life or science constructed speculative systems that cannot be assimilated by the critical mind. Only a combination of the religious, empiricistic, and logical can satisfactorily treat the theory of sin.

1. Religious.

(a) Friedrich Schleiermacher

"We shall exhaust the whole compass of Christian doctrine if we consider the facts of the religious self-consciousness, first, as they are presupposed by the antithesis expressed in the concept of redemption, and secondly, as they are determined by that antithesis." *1 This indicates the reason that Schleiermacher is called the father of modern theology; he was the first one to show the necessity of studying the religious nature itself and the experience of redemption. He is right to a certain extent in saying we exhaust doctrine when we consider the facts of consciousness, for there are many things we cannot wholly rationalize; he is wrong in saying we exhaust the whole compass of doctrine. All of his theology revolves around "the feeling of absolute dependence", the God-consciousness, and its development. This

*1. The Christian Faith, § 29, 123.

God-consciousness exists in every man, whether or not he seems to be religious. Sin arises and the God-consciousness is hindered because sense has gained the supremacy over spirit. All moral life is explained by this conflict; yielding to sense gives pain because of the God-consciousness, and on the other hand only determined effort and that continually will keep sense subjugated to spirit. Schleiermacher vacillates between making God the cause of sin and holding man responsible for sin. Because of his attachment to the absoluteness of God and the absolute dependence of man, he cannot conceive that man should introduce moral evil into the world unless God had willed it. So that he concludes that God willed that sin should exist, but that He willed it in a different way than He willed redemption. The absoluteness of God and the freedom of man, he accepts as one of the antinomies. He thinks quite persistently into these difficulties which have caused controversy from time immemorial. He considers the Fall given in Genesis 3, and rejects it as unhistorical; he becomes quite involved in the psychological problems of a fall from a neutral or perfect moral state. He does not think that if man was morally correct he could ever have done wrong; such a departure would contradict God's absoluteness. He recognizes that, if God caused or willed that sin should be, the moral responsibility of man is dangerously depleted, but he thinks it is the only position one can take. Thus God ordained that in man the sensuous nature should gain

the ascendence over the development of the God-consciousness. This applies to the first pair also as far as we can conceive, but we cannot know for certain since we do not understand their self-consciousness. The social character of sin takes the place of the doctrine of original sin; we are conscious of guilt for our own sin and are also conscious of being involved in the guilt of the race. This race guilt is not connected with any abstraction, but with the race as the sum of its individuals, each one of which is affected by the sin of society and ~~is~~ in turn ~~affected by~~ adds to it.

"Now while in general the manner in which the God-consciousness shapes itself in and with the affected self-consciousness can be traced simply to the act of the individual, the peculiarity of Christian piety consists in this: that whatever alienation from God there is in our affections, we are conscious of it as our own original act, which we call Sin; but whatever fellowship with God there is, we are conscious of it resting upon a communication from the Redeemer, which we call Grace." *1 The two, Sin and Grace, exist because God willed they should; they are essentially connected, though we are conscious of Sin existing anterior to Grace. Man's "turning from God must like all else be ordained by God; for of course man even in the state of sin is involved in the natural order, and it is only in virtue of his position within that order--with the entire range of which the divine

*1. The Christian Faith in Outline, § 63, 29

causality is co-extensive--that sin can develop in him at all." *1

The original perfection of man does not consist in a moral perfection possessed by our first parents and lost by the first act of sin. All we can grant, says Schleiermacher, is that man had and still has a pre-disposition to God-consciousness;*2 today we may have accumulated guilt and an added bent toward sin but we also have a stronger God-consciousness.

"We have the consciousness of sin whenever the God-consciousness which forms part of an inner state, or is in some way added to it, determines our self-consciousness as pain; and therefore we conceive of sin as a positive antagonism of the flesh against the spirit." *3 "We are conscious of sin as the power and work of a time when the disposition to the God-consciousness had not yet actively emerged in us." *4 "Now our proposition goes back to the universal experience that in each individual the flesh manifests itself as a reality before the spirit comes to be such, the result being, that, as soon as the spirit enters the sphere of consciousness (and it is involved in the original perfection of man that the independent activity of the flesh cannot of itself prevent the ingress of the spirit), resistance takes place, i.e. we become conscious also of sin as the God-consciousness awakes within us." *5 "Thus the

*1. The Christian Faith, §65, 269
*2. Ibid. 244 f.
*3. Ibid. §66, 271
*4. Ibid. §67, 273
*5. Ibid. 274

strength which the spirit gradually requires is the work and power of the period subsequent to the awaking of the God-consciousness, though of course in association with the previously given spiritual forces to the promptings of which that awaking was due; while the strength of the resistance made by the flesh and manifested in the consciousness of sin, is due to the advantage gained by the flesh during the prior time, though again, of course, in association with the corporate life upon which the amount of that advantage depends."*1

"We are conscious of sin partly as having its source in ourselves, partly as having its source outside our own being." *2 That is, sin is bound up in the solidarity of society. "The sinfulness that is present in an individual prior to any action of his own being, is in every case a complete incapacity for good, which can be removed only by the influence of Redemption." *3 "We admit then unreservedly this incapacity for good--good being understood here solely as that which is determined by the God-consciousness--between the limiting points of willing and doing, within which all self-activity must fall. Yet we must not magnify our congenital sinfulness to such an extent as would involve the denial of man's capacity to appropriate redemption, for that capacity is the very least that can be predicated of that disposition to the

*1. Ibid.
*2. Ibid. §69, 279
*3. Ibid. §70, 282

God-consciousness which is inherent in man's original perfection." *1 This incapacity for good refers only to man's personal activity and not to his receptivity; in redemption it is not a coöperation with God, "but a yielding of the self to the operation of grace." *2 There is a measure of good or virtue which can be reached without the immediate work of redemption; that may be called "civil righteousness."

"Original sin, however, is at the same time so really the personal guilt of every individual who shares in it that it is best represented as the corporate act and the corporate guilt of the human race, and that the recognition of it as such is likewise recognition of the universal need of redemption." *3 It is not that Adam's sin has affected us directly or that we all sinned in Adam, but that sin is social in character and influence. "Whether, in fact, we regard it as guilt and deed or rather as a spirit and a state, it is in either case common to all; not something that pertains severally to each individual and exists in relation to him by himself, but in each the work of all and in all the work of each; and only in this corporate character, indeed, can it be properly and fully understood." *4

In regard to the sin of Adam we are pretty much in the dark, for we cannot understand the consciousness of

*1. Ibid. 283 f.
*2. Ibid. 284
*3. Ibid 871
*4. Ibid. 288

the first pair. We "must seek for something that will explain the act as a whole. And this we can never find as long as we assume an inner state in which there was no spontaneous activity of the flesh, and the God-consciousness alone held sway; for in that case no sinful appetite could ever have arisen in the pair themselves, nor could Satan have made them believe that God had forbidden something out of jealousy, but their trust in God must already have been extinguished." *1 In the first human beings then as in us, God ordained that the sensuous nature should combat and surpass the God-consciousness.

"In all men (except in Christ, whom we regard as sinless) original sin is always issuing in actual sin." *2 "There is no difference of worth between men in regard to sin, apart from the fact that it does not in all stand in the same relationship to redemption." *3 "Once sin is present in man, he finds also in the world, as his sphere, persistent causes of hindrance to his life, that is, evils.... All evil is to be regarded as the punishment of sin, but only social evil as directly such, and natural evil as only indirectly." *4 "The dependence of evil upon sin, however, can be empirically established only as we consider a commu-

*1. Ibid. 294
*2. Ibid. § 73
*3. Ibid. § 74
*4. Ibid. 315 f.

nal life in its entirety; on no account must the evils affecting the individual be referred to his sin as their cause." *1

"Divine attributes relating to the consciousness of sin, even if only through the fact that redemption is conditioned by sin, can only be established if at the same time we regard God as the Author of sin." *2 "As in our self-consciousness sin and grace are opposed to each other, God, cannot be thought of as the Author of sin in the same sense as that in which He is the Author of redemption. But as we never have a consciousness of grace without a consciousness of sin, we must also assert that the existence of sin alongside of grace is ordained for us of God." *3 "If ecclesiastical doctrine seeks to solve this antinomy by the proposition that God is not the Author of sin, but that sin is grounded in human freedom, then this must be supplemented by the statement that God has ordained that the continually imperfect triumph of the spirit should become sin to us." *4

No one "can transfer the guilt from himself to common human nature; a man's sinful self-determinations are his own acts, alike whether they issue from the sinfulness

*1. Ibid. § 77, 320
*2. Ibid. § 79, 325
*3. Ibid. § 80, 326
*4. Ibid. § 81, 330

that is part and parcel of the principle of his individual will, or whether by means of them that sinfulness itself becomes more and more confirmed in him. None of these cases of determination, however, excludes the possibility of sin being related to the divine causality." *1 "We shall accordingly be able to say that, as the recognition of the commanding will is wrought in us by God, the fact that the inefficacy of the God-consciousness becomes sin in us is likewise wrought by Him, and indeed wrought with a view to redemption."*2 Our own theory, says Schleiermacher, "is that sin was ordained only in view of redemption, and that accordingly redemption shows forth as the gain bound up with sin; in comparison with which there can be no question whatever of mischief due to sin, for the merely gradual and imperfect unfolding of the power of the God-consciousness is one of the necessary conditions of the human stage of existence." *3 And thus "from that point of view the appearance of Christ and the institution of this new corporate life would have to be regarded as the completing, only now accomplished, of the creation of human nature." *4

This is Schleiermacher's doctrine of sin. I cannot see that it is really much different from Hegel's necessitarianism; if the former were not so avowedly religious and

*1. Ibid. 334 f.
*2. Ibid. 336
*3. Ibid. 338
*4. Ibid. 389

did not waver so much, it would probably be classed with those theories which leave no adequate place for morality or sin. If Schleiermacher had said that God ordained that man should sin afterwards to be redeemed from sin, he might have left a larger place for morality; but he does not say that. Sin is not something to be dispensed with; it "is one of the necessary conditions of the human stage of existence." God has ordained that man's sensuous nature should gain the ascendency over his spiritual nature and that thus he should sin. It is inconceivable that man should exist without sin, for man is developed only by sin. Sin is not an evil; it is a good, it is that without which redemption could not be, and without which man could never progress. Such a conception of sin is contradictory of all morality. If every man must sin and no man is ever free from sin, then there is no such thing as sin in the Christian sense of the term and the word had better be dismissed as a hopeless delusion. If Schleiermacher had meant by"sin", struggle and finite weakness, I would grant that man must sin and never will be totally free from sin; but he meant by "sin" acts or attitudes in some measure morally reprehensible.*1

He says that "throughout the entire range of sinful humanity there is not a single perfectly good action" and that there "is no difference of worth between men in regard to sin, apart from the fact that it does not in all stand in the same

*1. Ibid. §69, 280ff.; §71.

relationship to redemption." *[1] He goes on to say that "all actual sins must rank as equal not only in respect of their nature and character, but also of their origin; for every such sin is a manifestation of the universal sinfulness, and represents a victory, though but momentary or partial, of flesh over spirit." *[2] These statements are inconsistent with the belief in the guilt of sin; if all men are equally guilty, then no one is guilty. Schleiermacher regards sin as the sensuous nature overpowering the impotent God-consciousness; it exists in all men though in different forms. Of these various forms of sin one is really no worse than another. The sins of the Redeemed are not harmful to society, however, for the influence of the God-consciousness in them counteracts the influence of sin. In it all man seems to be the passive victim of God-ordained impulses. Yet Schleiermacher contended that sinners are guilty and that moral distinctions are valid. Orchard says: "Beginning with a desire to do justice to the Christian consciousness, he ends by denying its pronouncements." *[3]

One criticism often made of Schleiermacher is that he gives a superficial, inadequate explanation of sin by interpreting it as the predominance of the sense affections over the spirit. Pfleiderer objects to this: "a true analysis of

*1. Ibid. 306 f.
*2. Ibid.
*3. Modern Theories of Sin, P.77

the moral consciousness, uninfluenced by philosophical prepossessions will always discern in evil a conflict of the selfish individual will with the obligation of the law of the whole, and therein a self-contradiction within the mind itself, not merely a contradiction between mind and sense."*1 Ritschl says: "the conception of sin as the predominance of the flesh over the spirit always depends upon the fact that the spirit life is not covered by the laws of mechanism, but that it is accompanied by the consciousness of freedom. But who in attentively reading Schleiermacher's treatise can suppress the thought that the mechanical impediment of the spirit by the flesh is conceived as sin, only because the spirit knows that this ought not to find place?" *2

Schleiermacher does not account for the evil will. In fact he deliberately avoids speaking of the evil will because it seems to threaten God's absoluteness. He dwells so long upon the occasions and causes for sin that he seems to forget (at least he gives very little attention to) the really basic moral evil, that is, the evil will. Sense is sinful because it hinders the God-consciousness, he says. He is right to a certain extent, but he did not think deeply enough. In the last analysis, it is not sense or anything else that is sinful; it is the will that is good or evil, that favors and hinders the God-consciousness. He gives a psychological account of the universality of the suppression of the God-con-

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*1. Ibid.
*2. Ibid. 78

sciousness, but he does not tell us how man's spirit and will itself becomes evil. In fact he doubts the power of man to choose the evil if he was created good; and if he were created evil then he is not responsible. Throughout his treatment of sin he gives very little attention to the power of the finite will or to its importance in determining the moral character; it may be necessary in accepting redemption, but even then it is quite passive and incapable. But yet Schleiermacher professes to believe in the freedom of man, and the guilt of sin, both for the individual and for society. He does not reconcile the ought not of Christian consciousness with the divine sanction of sin. "Whether we can allow the 'ought not' of the moral judgement and the certainly 'is' of the metaphysical judgement to stand in contradiction, or allow the one to silence the other, or whether we should attempt to reconcile them in some higher point of view",*[1] he does not tell us satisfactorily.

To summarize my criticisms of Schleiermacher's theory of sin:

1. First of all, I would criticise his method. The deduction of all Christian doctrines from the Christian consciousness is impossible. The Christian consciousness is created somewhat by doctrine and would not exist wholly apart from doctrine. Christian consciousness corroborates rather than creates doctrine. While this religious method in the-

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*1. Modern Theories of Sin, P.79

ology is valuable and rich when it is combined with some other, it is untrustworthy and barren if completely dissociated from the contributions and corrections of theoretical reason.

2. The second criticism is that he makes God the author of Sin. Though he tries to avoid the moral contradictions of it and though he tries to modify it, yet he concludes that God is the author of sin. This really abolishes morality and freedom, but Schleiermacher is generally recognized as a freedomist, probably because he wanted so much to be.

3. The third objection I have is to his definition of sin as the ascendency of sense over spirit. As Pfleiderer said, sin is more than the conflict between sense and the mind, it is conflict within the mind itself. His definition is too narrow.

4. The fourth criticism is much the same as the second; it is really the practical side of the second. It is that he overstresses the super-individual character of sin and does not connect sin with the will of man sufficiently to explain individual guilt. That is, he emphasizes the strength of the sense nature and the strength of social sin until he almost obscures the fact of deliberate, intelligent wrongdoing. I believe these four are the fundamental criticisms of Schleiermacher's account of sin.

(b) Ritschl

Ritschl's theory of sin is the least befogged of any

we have yet treated. It is clear, practical, and moderate. It is quite free from traditionalism and from theosophy. It revolves, as Schleiermacher's does, around the religious consciousness, and particularly around redemption and the Christian idea of the Kingdom of God. It has made two or three valuable contributions to the Christian conception of sin and redemption.

Ritschl says that we can only know what the bad is when we know the good. The more clearly we conceive the good, the more correct our idea of sin; hence he concludes that we can best know the nature of sin when we have grasped Christ and the atonement. He rejects the idea of original sin and develops the idea of social sin, the kingdom of sin, which Schleiermacher broached. He insists upon degrees of sin, from the least sins of ignorance to the intelligent, comprehending, deliberate rejection of the good; the latter, he says, cannot be forgiven. He rejects the idea that there is any connection between sin and evil; the only evil that accompanies sin is the feeling of guilt, and that is really a blessing since it leads toward reconciliation. The point where Ritschl is subjected to the closest criticism is in his teaching that God looks upon all sins that can be forgiven as sins of ignorance. I will attempt to defend his position there later.

First of all he states that our knowledge of sin is received through our knowledge of redemption. "Sin is the negative presupposition of reconciliation........Since we have to comprehend the fact of sin from the standpoint of the

reconciled community, the Gospel of the forgiveness of sins is actually the ground of our knowledge of our sinfulness."*1 Men "were familiar with the fact of sin even apart from Christianity. But the determination of its nature, and the estimate of its compass and its worthlessness, are expressed in a peculiar form in Christianity, for here there obtain ideas of God, of the supreme good, of the moral destiny of man, and of redemption, different from those which are to be found in any other religion." *2 These statements one cannot question, though there are some who would not isolate Christianity from other religions as definitely as he does.

He rejects the comparison of man's present state with his original righteousness as the method for realizing the nature of sin, but he recognizes value in the Evangelical conception. The "dogmatic doctrine of man must not be filled up by adducing elements from the Biblical creation document, but by that spiritual and moral conception of man which is revealed in the life-course of Jesus, and His intention to found the Kingdom of God." *3 The "Catholic interpretation of the subject, according to which original righteousness was added to human nature as a gift of grace, implies that the Christian ideal falls outside the essential constitution of man......The Evangelical assumption, on the other hand, that our first parents were created with righteousness as the content of their nature, is an expression of the fact that the

*1. Christian Doctrine of Justification and Reconciliation. 327
*2. Ibid. 328
*3. Ibid. 331

Christian ideal falls within the limits of man's constitution and that in Dogmatics the general nature of man ought to be interpreted in the light of this standard. Conceived in this fashion, the idea of i$\overset{u}{n}$stitia originalis is confessionally important and dogmatically significant; it is in comparison a matter of indifference that no ground exists for supposing that our first parents were endowed with this attribute." *1 He accepts Schleiermacher's revolutionary view of the place of Christ. He is not the restoration of the world as much as He is the completion of creation; that is, "the common destiny of men, through which they attain their distinction from nature and their lordship over the world, was first realized in its full compass in the self-consciousness of Christ, and through Him made manifest and effective." *2

Sin is distinctly a religious idea. "A given action, in the light of human society and the law of the State, is a wrong and a crime. But the same action is sin when it springs from indifference towards God, as the Benefactor and Governor of human life. By bringing out this aspect we stamp sin as a religious idea, as a characteristic value-notion."*3 I think I have made clear in the Introduction the relation between sin and immorality, but Ritschl adds a new emphasis in the definition of sin, that is, sin is fundamentally indifference to a person who is intrinsically worthy of all our interest.

*1. Ibid. 331 f.
*2. Ibid. 332
*3. Ibid. 334

Sin can not be known theoretically; the doctrine of sin must be formed in accordance with experience. We know sin as the antinomy of the Kingdom of God; Ritschl calls it the Kingdom of Sin. He rejects the Augustinian teaching of original sin for this new social conception. The principle that the will is made evil by actual sins, a principle which is opposed to the teaching of original sin, is one that we all accept. "In the first place, on it rests every kind of responsibility for evil which we impose upon ourselves. Only if we discern in the individual action the proof-mark of the independence of the will, can we ascribe to ourselves, not mere individual actions, but likewise evil habit or evil inclination......Secondly, education is possible only on the presupposition that existing bad habits or evil inclinations have come to exist as the product of repeated acts of the will......Thirdly, the assumption we make of distinct degrees of evil in individuals--an assumption rendered indispensable by practical considerations--is incompatible with the dogma of original sin, which asserts of all the descendants of Adam an equally high degree of sinful inclination, and that the highest possible, namely, that they have falled into universal and obstinate resistance to the Divine good, and into the possession of the devil." *1

Ritschl's Kingdom of Sin gives more intelligible expression to the strength and universality of sin which was expressed so poorly in the doctrine of original sin. "All these

*1. Ibid. 336

grades of habitual sin we include in the vast complexity of sinful action when we form the idea of the kingdom of sin."*1 Each one breathes the tainted atmosphere and is affected by the evil influence of society; and in turn each one contributes actual sin and evil influences to society. We cannot estimate the effect of the presence of sin in society but we know we are all influenced by it. This does not mean that it is something superimposed on us; it is the work of society. Nor does it mean that society is totally depraved; it simply takes into account the actual presence of sin and its evil effects. The Kingdom of God is opposed to this evil kingdom. It is possible that one can live without sin and the universality of sin is merely a generalization from the prevalence of sin.

Ritschl rejects the thought that there is a necessary connection between evil and sin. Reason "forbids us to adhere to the objective theory of the interconnection of sin and evil as being the rule." *2 Evil may even be positively good in developing character. He says "that the entrance of universal sin has in no wise had the effect of abolishing and neutralizing the original character of the opposition between the world and us, which was to serve as a restriction, and yet as a stimulus to the development of freedom." *3 This error is due to too narrow a conception of reconciliation.

*1. Ibid. 338
*2. Ibid. 354
*3. Ibid. 355

Reconciliation "is not merely the ground of deliverance from the guilt of sin, and from the evils in some way merited; it is also the ground of deliverance from the world, and the ground of spiritual and moral lordship over the world." *1

He is very positive that there are degrees of sin and makes a distinct contribution to ha~~r~~martiology in his emphasis on the place of ignorance in sin. "The assertion that sin is infinite in its nature, even when removed by the redemptive work of Christ, is the result of a purely rational inference"--and such inferences are too far from the truth to be accepted he thinks. "The distinction between sin as ignorance and sin as final decision against recognized good, is thinkable first of all as related to the concept of sin in general. Sin in general is active and habitual opposition to God and to the good--the good which men discern, with some measure either of vague presentiment or of definite knowledge, to be the final end guaranteed by God for the human will." *2 Sin is always "opposition to the good, that conception being defined in an ethical sense, so that the least deviation from the good or even the simple omission of the good already forms opposition to; for the good must be unconditionally and completely realized by the will at every moment." *3

It is interesting to compare Ritschl with Tennant right here. The former begins by making sin very broad and

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*1. Ibid. 357
*2. Ibid. 377
*3. Ibid.

sinister; the least deviation or omission of the will is sin. Then he alleviates the dark picture by the introduction of the great element of ignorance. Tennant begins by limiting sin to deliberate, conscious wrongdoing; then, after allowing for every possible foreign element, he expresses himself firmly on the grave character of moral evil. They seem to be about the same, and I rather think they are, though I think Ritschl shows the more profound moral insight. Life is shot through with morality; I think we should first appreciate that fact, and then ~~grasp~~ allow for the weakness, ignorance, and handicaps of men. At any rate, Ritschl is accused of dissolving sin into ignorance, and Tennant of reducing it to isolated acts.

"Ignorance, also, is not the sufficient ground for the confirming of the will in sin; for the will and knowledge are not wholly commensurable with one another. Therefore, neither a priori nor yet in accordance with the conditions of experience, is it to be denied that there may be a sinless development of life." *[1] We will have to be satisfied with saying that ignorant sins are forgiven. "We cannot, certainly, avoid taking into consideration the fact that there fall under this category those sins, likewise, which present themselves to our human judgement as a thoroughly confirmed habit of hardening (Eph. 4:17-19). But if we are to maintain our good faith that such men are not regarded by God as past redemption, the conclusion which suggests itself is that God looks upon

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*1. Ibid. 377 f.

their sin in a different light, namely, as ignorance." *1

I do not believe that Ritschl meant to dissolve sin into ignorance. He merely meant to show the large part that ignorance plays in sin; the greater the ignorance the less guilty the sin. He says that those sinners cannot be forgiven whose opposition to God has come to full consciousness and determination, and we cannot conceive how they could be forgiven; or rather we cannot conceive of men coming to such a place of opposition. At least we cannot think of many whom we have met who have come to such a place; if there is any impossibility in such cases, it is the inability of men to repent because of their self-hardened character and not the unwillingness of God to forgive. "Whether there are such men, and who they are, are questions we cannot answer," says Ritschl. The "love of God can be conceived in relation to such sinners as have not fallen into that degree of sin which excludes conversion of the will. It is just this negative relation that is expressed by the predication of ignorance--and nothing more." *2

There are no such decisive arguments against Ritschl as are brought against his predecessors, but that there are weaknesses in his theory is unquestionable. The first criticism is against his method; he avoided difficulties his great contemporary did not, but, nevertheless, I contend that the religious method alone is too narrow for the doctrine of sin.

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*1. Ibid. 379
*2. Ibid. 383

He does not show clearly enough the moral side of what he calls the religious idea, sin. He does not state decisively enough the guilt of sin, probably because of the stress he put on ignorance. Orchard says he leaves "unresolved difficulties."*1 He says that experience contradicts Ritschl, for we are conscious of being forgiven of deliberate sins. He says he does not make clear why God cannot forgive the deliberate opposer of His will and whether or not God loves such thorough-going rejecters of the good.

I do not think these last criticisms of Ritschl are valid. Ritschl did not clarify some points sufficiently, but I agree with his general conclusions on ignorance. They are: that ignorance plays a large part in most sin; that it facilitates God's forgiveness of sin and man's recovery from sin; that, since we can see some measure of ignorance in every sinner, if not in every act, we may reasonably conclude that redemption is impossible for the person whose "opposition to the Divine order of good has come to the full consciousness and determination." This impossibility may arise from the fact that it cannot be that a finite being under the influences of God and society is capable of being totally bad; it may arise from the incapability of such a person to break his own self-hardened will, or (the least likely) from the unwillingness or incapability of God to forgive (for reasons we know not of) such a person. No matter what our conclusions about that we know people who are progressively evil despite all good in-

*1. Orchard 86 ff.

fluences and whom we have little reason to think will ever seek the Kingdom of God. And yet though I agree with Ritschl on these conclusions I think he did not state the reason for forgiveness. We are less guilty the more ignorant we are, unless it is deliberate or negligent ignorance. But after we boil sin down as far as possible there is a measure of deliberate wrong doing. And this is only forgiven because of the self-sacrificing, forgiving spirit of the Father, the Christlikeness of God. That is the real beauty and wonder of the Gospel.

Mackintosh makes the criticism that is generally made of Ritschl, that is, "he erases from the Gospel everything remedial. Small sins, of 'ignorance', need no expiation; great sins admit of none." *1 Again, I repeat that Ritschl was not as clear in his exposition as he should have been, but that this criticism is a little too harsh. He admits that Ritschl "interprets forgiveness in terms of ethical personality. To forgive is to readmit to personal fellowship",*2 not to remit external penalties. This is another of his significant advances.

2. Empiricistic

(a) Pfleiderer

The theories in this group attempt to explain sin from empirical observation. "The increasing popularity of this method with the modern mind is due to the general dis-

*1. Christianity and Sin, 134
*2. Ibid.

trust of abstract or philosophical reasoning, with the doubtful conceptions it seems to start from, and the unworkable conclusions it seems to reach; it is the fashion to bring everything to the test of experience, and to confine our attention to matters that have experimental value; and the inductive method of Science, which has achieved such notable triumphs in humbler spheres, and which is now invading every department of thought, has naturally gone a long way to popularize this method." *[1] The spirit of these theories is particularly akin to ours and their psychological study seems quite rational, but we must re-iterate that the empirical method alone cannot adequately treat of theology in general or the doctrine of sin in particular.

Pfleiderer in his treatment of sin in "Philosophy of Religion" deals for the most part with its origin in the individual life. The source of sin cannot be found in the sensuous nature, or anywhere save in the "spiritual direction of will". *[2] Sin is selfishness, seeking satisfaction outside the whole and opposed to the whole; it is "the resistance of the particular will to the Divine will". But at first it is not connected with God; in the child it has to do merely with free choice. The "will is never in reality the empty possibility indeterminism takes it to be, equally capable of turning to any side and after any action, empty again, undetermined without direction." *[3] Yet it is a fact

*1. Orchard 89
*2. Ibid.(Quoted on 90)
*3. Ibid.

that we are conscious that from the dawn of moral awareness we find evil in us as a power, "the origin of which accordingly must lie beyond the conscious exercise of freedom." Pfleiderer rejects the idea of pre-existence and the idea of a timeless choice as too speculative; the only think to do is to turn to the individual life. There the "psychological genesis of evil is not difficult to understand"; the satisfaction of natural tendencies is necessary to life, and the tendency towards this satisfaction lies "in the essence of the will, or indeed is that essence." *1

The process is about as follows. Early in the life of the child the will asserts itself in the satisfaction of natural impulses; there is nothing wrong in that, because moral consciousness has not come and also because it is only in this way that life is preserved. Soon the will of parents and the conflicting needs of others inhibit the activity of the selfish will. Through punishment and education and through varied experience the moral consciousness gradually awakens. The earliest inhibitions having brought the instinctive assertion of the natively selfish will, we find within the self with the coming of moral consciousness an already "powerful inclination of self-will to lawlessness." The transition is too gradual for us to detect the first sin; sin and guilt are relative and are incumbent only when there is conscious opposition to a moral standard. Growth of knowledge and moral possibility increases moral responsibility and guilt.

*1. Ibid. (Quoted on 91)

"If accordingly evil only becomes actual in the lawless self-determination of the finite will, then evil must have its origin in the creature, not in God." *[1] Yet evil "was foreseen by God and ordained along with the good, not as a thing that ought not to be, but as a thing that could not not-be." *[2] God's attitude toward us, Pfleiderer says, must be one of "sympathy".

There is a very evident inconsistency between the pronouncement of guilt which conscience places upon us and the "sympathy" of God. I think that Pfleiderer has given a pretty accurate account of the origin of sin in the individual. There is one element which he should have taken into account, that is, the evil influences of heredity and environment on the individual. Granted then that his account of the origin and nature of sin is pretty accurate. I do not think he was compelled to say that sin could not not-be or that God's attitude toward us is merely one of sympathy. His system could quite logically allow for the possibility of not sinning and for the guilt of conscious sin.

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*1. Ibid. (Quoted on 92)
*2. Ibid. (Quoted on 93)

(a) Tennant --

One of the most significant writers on the problem in the last half century is Dr. F.R. Tennant. His three books, The Origin and Propagation of Sin, The Concept of Sin, and The Sources of the Doctrines of the Fall and Original Sin, are quite important for us, the first two in particular. He is the first English writer to acknowledge the theory of evolution; he "set a long-needed example to English theology in his frank endeavour to recognize the new facts concerning man's origin brought to light by scientific research, and to discover what alteration they entail in the theological doctrine of sin."[*1] There is much that is like Pfleiderer in his system, but Tennant gives more attention to the appearance of morality in the race and he also gives more emphasis to the element of guilt.

He recognized the seeming contradiction between the universality of sin and feeling of personal guilt; feeling strongly as he did the reality of guilt he modified the concept of universality. He concludes with Ritschl that the latter concept is a generalisation from experience not a deduction from a given principle. Instead of falling back on the doctrine of original sin, he establishes these positions:

(a) Man inherits the natural and essential instincts and impulses of his animal ancestors; these are necessarily non-moral, and there is no reason to ascribe to them any kind of abnormality.

[*1] Orchard 94.

(b) Voluntary action in man appears before any consciousness of right and wrong. There has been a period, therefore, in the history of the race and the individual, in which even volitional conduct has been innocent, however far such conduct differs from that later prescribed by moral sanctions and the conscience.

So far, sin has not emerged at all.

(c) A period is reached during which moral sentiment is gradually evoked and moral sanctions are gradually constructed. Acts once knowing no law begin to be regarded as wrong. The performance of them henceforth constitutes sin.

(d) The earliest sanctions known to the race were but crudely ethical, and their crudity was but gradually exchanged for the refinement characteristic of highly developed morality. Similarly, the subjective sense of guiltiness, in the primitive sinner as in the child of very tender years, would at first be relatively slight, and would increase pari passu with the objective holiness and severity of the ethical code."*[1] This is a summary of Tennant's conception of the origin and growth of sin in the individual and the race.

Perhaps before going any farther it would be wise to give his definition of sin as presented in The Concept of Sin. He associates sin only with that which is morally responsible. Sin is colored by a religious element; "it belongs to the sphere of morality touched with religious emotion."*[2]

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*1. Origin and Propagation, Preface XXIf.
*2. Concept of Sin 19.

"But, after all, it is the moral element in sin that is primary: this alone is universal."*[1] Only "conscious or intentional activity accompanied by sufficient knowledge of its badness or lawlessness is sin."*[2] What is not wilful violation of known law is not sin, but imperfection. The "fundamental requisites for the moral activity which constitutes sin....are respectively: a moral law to be transgressed; ~~k~~ knowledge thereof, by an agent, sufficient to render him a moral subject with regard to it; opposition between impulse and reason; and lastly, intentional volition as an indispensable factor in all conduct that is rightly to be called moral."*[3] The standard is not the same; it varies with all individuals and all times; it is a relative standard, i.e. the knowledge of the individual. Guilt is not easily determined; it rises by almost imperceptible degrees from innocence, but it is nevertheless real.

In the individual there are involuntary stages or types of the conative and emotional modes of consciousness.* Before the dawn of the moral consciousness the will has been accustomed to assert itself for the things which self desires. Thus these natural impulses, which are necessary for the preservation of life, have furnished the material for the self-centeredness of the will. When moral consciousness arises

*1. Ibid. 24
*2. Ibid. 27
*3. Ibid. 45

the individual finds it easy to sin; but it is only when violation of right is intentional that it is guilty and only then is it really sin. "Defined as broadly as possible, an impulse is a conation operating through its own intrinsic strength and in independence of the system of mental life as a whole. It differs from instinct in that it is not wholly excited by external stimulus but is initiated by a craving."*1

God has ordained that the will struggle against the clamor of these non-moral but strong tendencies. The will is biased in its gradual development because of these conative tendencies which rule quite largely before moral consciousness arises. These impulses (which are spiritual as well as physical) are necessary to life and are morally neutral, and yet they are the "material" of sin for they furnish the struggle and the motives which are necessary to morality.

These are practically the same as Pfleiderer's psychological considerations, but Tennant goes farther and says that the development of the race has been like that of the individual. The "human infant is simply a non-moral ~~infant~~ animal"; as it grows from this condition into the recognition of parental law and then moral law, so the race has grown from animal life to morality and religion. There is one great difficulty with this statement. That is this, - the child is potentially moral; we cannot say that of the animal.

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*1. Ibid. 135

Leaving the evolution of the race for a moment to return to the universality of sin in the individual. "It is simply the general failure to effect on all occasions the moralisation of inevitable impulses and to choose the end of higher worth rather than that which, of lower value, appeals with the more clamorous intensity."*1 Thus, practically, it seems that everyone sins, but, theoretically, it is possible for one not to sin and to remain sinless. Then again, the transition from non-morality to morality is so gradual that it is impossible to point it out, so that the sinful~~l~~ness of early acts gradually increases from zero. This explanation is quite satisfactory in explaining the relative universality of sin and the degrees of guilt; -satisfactory as far as it goes. It leaves out the truth that is to be found in Ritschl's kingdom of sin. There is a deeper truth than that of animal impulses; it is the truth of the moral depravity of society. ~~W~~ We receive the influence of a society that has sinned and acquired sinful character, and in turn we sin and add our influence to that of others. This is not the strength of nOn-moral impulses, it is the depravity of wills and moral character. The individual born into society not only is heir to the animal nature, he is also heir to the influence of deliberately sinful acts and sinful characters. Whether or not that influence reaches him through environment and education

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*1. Orchard 97.

alone or also through heredity is not all-important (though I am of the opinion that it is both); the awful fact is that it reaches him.

In his theodicy Tennant says "that responsibility for the possibility of moral evil and for the opportunities for its realisation lies with God," but "that responsibility for the actuality of moral evil lies with man."*[1] That judgement is correct, but it is the judgement of a moralist and not of an empiricist and an evolutionist. Tennant "judges others mercilessly from a biological standpoint, and, if they go beyond naturalism, condemns them. His weakness surely appears when he has suddenly to desert his old standpoint, and makes appeal to 'intuition', to a 'purified creationism', to 'Lotze's Theism'."*[2] The facts of evolution are for the most part empirical, while freedom, morality and sin are rational and ethical judgements. The two cannot be reconciled if one starts out strictly as an empiricist.

Another thing which Tennant can never account for while he sticks to empiricism is the appearance of morality in the evolution of the race. It is a vain delusion to think that moral can ever be evolved from unmoral. The atheistic evolutionist must carry all that is evolved back into the very first reality and then he can never account for the potentiality of morality without a moral creator. Even the theistic evolutionist has some difficulty with the appearance of morality for he "must postulate a special forth-putting of divine power when rational and moral mind first appeared."*[3]

*1. Origin and Propagation 122.
*2. Christianity and Sin 143. *3. Ibid. 141

And some express a doubt whether such an intervention is germane to evolutionism.

Tennant is not very clear in his treatment of this problem. He holds that only those characteristics can be transmitted which are connected with modifications of the organism. Yet he believes in the evolution of the race, not only within the limits of morality, but even from non-morality to morality. In other words the development of the organism from its most rudimentary form historically is sufficient explanation for the difference between that most rudimentary form and the spiritual, moral, and religious nature of man. Such an inference is too crass for rationalistic theism to accept. And Tennant does not accept it consistently. The fact is that an immanent God is the only explanation for scientific evolution and for the appearance of new elements. A windowless system of evolution is a logical abstraction. Accepting Tennant's account of the growth of the race and the individual, we must assert that the rational and moral mind can only be explained by the creative activity of God. We must strike a compromise between the a priori and the empiricistic account of morality.

Our estimate of Tennant then is that he is the most modern of any we have yet treated: he has introduced evolution into the theory of sin, has developed the psychological

and empirical method, and has at the same time kept a profound sense of the guilt of man. His chief weakness is that he does not allow the moral and religious consciousness the authority which the conclusions he reaches demand. "Volition, and volition alone.....is sinful. Conversely, immoral volition is affirmed to be sin - and nothing else: not disease, or inherited weakness, or unavoidable effect of surroundings, or anything but guilty and accountable transgression that ought not to have been and might not have been."*1 A man cannot make an assertion like that unless he grants the will moral autonomy as Kant did.

3. Logical --

(a) Kant - This is the man who is responsible more than any other for morally grounded metaphysics. He and those who were influenced by him have given the moral and religious nature an autonomous place in personality. Morality no longer lives on the crumbs from the table of all-powerful intellect. It might almost be said that the tables are reversed, but at any rate among consistent thinkers the moral nature and the religious nature hold as authoritative a place as the intellectual or aesthetic. This debt we owe partly to Kant.

But there are some other considerations . "Kantian ethics offer help to Christian philosophy and hamartiology

*1. Concept of Sin, 246f.

in telling us that moral truth stands higher than any other knowledge, and that in obeying our own reason we know from inside what goodness means. But there are two drawbacks. Knowledge in other regions - knowledge, as such - seems to be a hollow thing. Secondly, the free and responsible actions of man, it seems, predetermined like eclipses."[*1]

Kant and Müller both ground sin in the free will of man and both are certain that sin is universal and that man is personally responsible. But neither of them gives an empirical account of these assertions of the moral self and the religious consciousness. They find the will preverted and recognize that it must have been preverted by actual sin. So they start back to find the first sin, but as far as they go they find the sinful will beyond. Kant concludes that the Choice must be a choice of Reason not of history; he postulates a timeless choice of the individual. Müller postulates a pre-temporal choice of self and rejection of God. Coleridge becomes one step more speculative and decides that Original Sin is "a timeless act" of "all human wills collectively."

Returning to Tennant for a criticism of these intellectualistic theories: the tendency is to regard sin in its original stages too much as what it becomes in its worst stages; the universality of sin has led to the belief in a common origin of sin independently of individual self-determinism.[*2]

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*1. Christianity and Sin, 119
*2. Origin and Propagation 78f

He asks, "Can we find the ground of the possibility and occasion for sin in our natural constitution regarded as the perfectly normal result of development through which the race has passed previous to the aquisition of full moral personality?"*1 There is no doubt that the introduction of an empirical evolutionary investigation would have eliminated the artificialities and inconsistencies from these systems.

Kant fixed a great gulf between noumena and phenomena, between the Practical and the Pure Reason. Between the Rational and the Moral account of man there is absolute contradiction. On the one hand "man is himself a phenomenon" and therefore all his actions, empirically considered, are but links in a necessitous chain of cause and effect. "If, then, we could investigate all the phenomena of human volition to their lowest foundation in the mind, there would be no action which we could not anticipate with certainty, and recognize to be absolutely necessary from its preceding conditions."*2 On the other hand, the sinner is regarded as wholly responsible for his sin and just as if he had fallen from a state of innocence.

After having limited pure reason to phenomena, he starts to investigate the practical reason. The starting point is the categorical imperative: "act only on that maxim whereby thou canst at the same time will that it should become a universal law." From this sense of "ought" he postulates

*1. Ibid. 81
*2. Quoted in Orchard 32

God, freedom and immortality. But then arises the inexplicable fact of the prevalence of sin and violation of the moral law. How a condition so universal could arise from the mere idea of freedom is a puzzle unless there be a 'radical badness' in human nature. There are three grades of this evil: frailty or weakness, impurity or mixed motives, and perversity or depravity.

Kant does not believe that any man is altogether bad; he speaks of the "indwelling of the Bad Principle along with the Good; or, on the Radical Evil in human nature."*[1] He says, "by the notion of propensity we understand a subjective ground of determination of the elective will antecedent to any act, and which is consequently not in itself an act."*[2] "Now the term 'act' in general applies to that use of freedom by which the supreme maxim is adopted into one's elective will (conformably or contrary to the law), as well as to that in which actions themselves (as to their matter, that is, the objective will) are performed in accordance with that maxim. The propensity to evil is an act in the former sense (peccatum originarium), and is at the same time the formal source of every act in the second sense, which in its matter violates the law and is called vice) (peccatum derivatium); and the first fault remains, even though the second may be often

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*1. Critique of Practical Reason etc. (Transl. by Abbott) 325
*2. Ibid. 338

avoided (from motives other than the law itself). The former is an intelligible act only cognizable by reason, apart from any condition of time; the latter sensible, empirical, given in time (factum phaenomenon)."*1 That is a summary statement of the idea of a timeless choice of evil.

The weaknesses in Kant are quite manifest: the dualism of phenomenon and noumenon; the lack of developmental emphasis; the contradiction between necessary action and guilt; the impractical, unempirical conception of the origin of sin and of the nature of redemption. The latter is merely a kind of reform that is cold and non-religious. The great contribution he has made is the unchallengeable position he has given the moral nature; he did not express it as well as Troeltsch, Otto, and Bowne, but he laid the foundation stone for further thought.

(b(Julius Müller --

Müller has written an ambitious monograph of two volumes on the Christian Doctrine of Sin; since his time there has been no one so thorough and exhaustive. But it is too speculative and "the method of treatment, ignoring on one hand the transcendentalism of Kant, and failing to satisfy the modern demand for the concrete and experimental, is altogether too scholastic and abstract."*2 He is quite a thorough rationalist and yet he marks some advance beyond Kant. He leans a

*1. Ibid.
*2. Orchard 49

little toward empiricism; he recognizes the necessity of moral development; he insists on degrees of guilt and on the existence of other good motives besides that of duty. He does not have the chasm between moral and intellectual nature. He has formed a strong well-developed system that stood well until modern empiricism offered its more rational accounts of the origin of sin. It revolves around the guilt of sin.

He gives a lengthy discussion of the problem of freedom and reaches the conclusion that is generally accepted by idealists. We are subject to a "successive development in which every moral moment appears as a mixed result of free self-determination, and dependence upon the previously developed."*[1] This is somewhat more satisfactory than Kant's freedom, which is absolutely denied by his phenomena and which teaches that each sin is committed as though it were a fall from innocence. In general Müller is much more matter-of-fact than his greater countryman. The only place where he seriously disagrees with modern thought is in his account of the origin of sin. He recognizes development, degrees of guilt, the religious character of sin; he has a personalistic view of morality rather than a legalistic balance sheet. He is not altogether free from the idea of stern justice and payment for right or wrong acts. In speaking of the relation of the sense of guilt to actual guilt he says, sin "demands, moreover, an expiation, though the sinner be himself unconscious

*1. Ibid. 51

of the relation in which he stands to the injured majesty of the divine law."[*1] But even then he recognizes that man is judged not by an absolute standard, but by his own knowledge of right; "it is requisite that the individual sin be produced by the will of the subject, with the consciousness that it is sin."[*2] "God's holy love not only precludes His having any part whatever in the origination of sin, it implies His emphatic negation of its continuance. With a personal being, opposition to God's will must at least be possible, but it can not acquire any permanent value in a world created and ruled by God."[*3]

The real principle of sin is not pride or sensuality or anything that is so simple; it is the principle of self; not self-respect but self set up in opposition to the love of God. This is quite Hegelian but it is more concrete and personalistic than Hegel is. "Having by our investigations thus far discovered Love to God is the real principle of moral good, it is evident that moral evil as the antithesis to moral good must have as its inner principle the want of this love, in the estrangement of man from God. Sin is certainly a perversion of our relations to the world also, but as our true relations to the world arise out of our true relation to God, the derangement of the former is necessarily involved in the derangement of the latter;.....This estrangement of man from God is in

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[*1] Doctrine of Sin I 210

[*2] Orchard 50

[*3] Doctrine of Sin I 248

itself the primary sin and the source of all other depravity."*[1]

Müller's idea of punishment is that it is disciplinary to some extent, but also that it is the "revelation of the fact that the majesty of law has not been dethroned by rebellion against it. The moral law, which has to do with the will, cannot directly force it as by a necessity of nature to fulfil its requirements, the very conception of it as distinct from natural law permits the resistance of the will; but it maintains its character as law by realizing itself indirectly through the punishment following upon such resistance."*[2]

He gives half of the second volume to the problem of freedom. After having determined the nature of sin, the freedom of the will and the guilt of sin, he starts to investigate the origin of sin. He is convinced that man's will is made evil by actual deliberate sin and he is quite blind to the possibilities of an evolutionary explanation of sin. So he traces the life of sin back in an effort to find a state of pure indecision. But he fails to find this aequilibrium, this "moment when there is a perfectly equal balance of opposite impulses."*[3] This is the place where Müller's error is most apparent; he has grasped the facts of moral life but when he starts to look for a moment of pure indecision he is seen to be blind to the facts of moral development.

*1. Ibid. I 129
*2. Ibid. I 245
*3. Ibid. II 70

He recognizes somewhat the mistake, for he says all trace of morality in childhood is lost in "an unconscious twilight." Furthermore, if "there were at the outset of our conscious life any such an individual fall, wherein the will emerged from a state of pure indeterminateness into a decision to commit sin, from which commencement, likewise, our development, hitherto normal became perverted, this first dark deed casting its ghastly shadow over our whole life would surely leave an indelible mark upon our memory."*[1] It cannot be that the innocence of childhood is guilty of the blackest, most far-reaching sin of life, that which is responsible for all succeeding acts.

"Thus we are driven to the idea of a sinfulness lying beyond our individual existence in time, a sinfulness which either directly or in its consequences involves guilt, and therefore must have its origin in our personal self-decision. It affects our conduct, our entire development from the very beginning, and yet it can only have its origin in our own act. This would clearly be a contradiction if our personality had no existence previous to our earthly and temporal life, furnishing a sphere for the exercise of that self-decision whereby our moral nature is molded from the outset. Thus the undeniable facts of human life and consciousness lead us at least to the very same ideas to which a careful investigation of human freedom brought us, the idea That Created Personality

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*1. Ibid. II 71

Must Have Had An Extra-Temporal Existence influencing its life in time."[1]

"There is a three fold primitive state of man: first, his state as conceived in the divine ideal; secondly, his state in the extra-temporal existence of the ego; and thirdly, his state in the temporal commencement of his earthly development."[2] During this period of extra-temporal existence each individual has chosen self as the principle of life and has fallen. The perversion of this fall, which must be from a state of innocence and an act of the will, accounts for the universality of sin and the absence of any absolutely indetermined action in this life.

We cannot conceive of a state with no determinations and a perfect balance of impulses. Müller would reply that there could be no true freedom then, and he is striving to maintain freedom and guilt. But if there were such a state we cannot find any reason why sin should have been committed. There is no need, for an explanation of sin, to construe the first sin as a deliberate fall from a state of neutral innocence. He is right in concluding that from the first dawn of moral consciousness we are torn by impulses and apparently given to the pursuit of the principle of self. But his inferring an extra-temporal existence in which we each individually rejected God and enthroned self is far too speculative and medieval for modern psychology. He is to be trusted in his assertion of the fact of freedom, sin and guilt, but Pfleiderer's and Tennant's accounts of the origin of sin are more to be trusted than his extra-temporal choice.

[1] Ibid. II 358

[2] Ibid. II 380

C. Lesser Writers

There are some other men whom I will consider briefly. S. T. Coleridge treats the problem of sin in his Aids to Reflection. He says that the will is the source of all actual sin; but he also says that the will is made corrupt by actual sin, so that he is involved in an infinite regress and finally concludes that sin is a mystery. He postulates, however, "a timeless act" of "all human wills collectively" as the origin of sin; such speculation about a Universal Will is meaningless.

John Tulloch in the Christian Doctrine of Sin, the Croall Lectures for 1876, uses the historical method in a limited way. "It will be our aim, therefore, instead of beginning with the full idea of sin and appealing to the Scripture everywhere for its proof, to review the idea in its gradual development."*[1] He represents a little advance over the conservative church writers, but he confines himself almost entirely to an exposition of the Biblical doctrine.

H. V. S. Eck's volume, Sin, makes no pretense to launch into free inquiry. He begins by stating that the church's doctrines are the most satisfactory; then he endeavors to defend

*1. Page 23

them and to explain their difficulties away. It is practical in its aim.

Evolution and the Fall, the Bishop Paddock Lectures for 1910, by Francis J. Hall is a more critical study. ~~in time and in spirit.~~ It is an attempt by a high churchman to reconcile modern scientific and theistic evolution with the old church doctrines. It is a work of some merit and yields as much as its author dares to science; it gives some time to establishing theistic evolution. The chief doctrines affected by the evolutionary hypothesis are theistic teleology, creation, Biblical infallibility, and man's primitive state and fall. To state one of the author's more conservative positions -- "I believe it to be clear that the narrative implies the non-necessity of man's first transgression, its conscious wilfulness, and its being followed by loss of certain spiritual and supernatural advantages previously enjoyed---including communion with God, and divine favor, immunity from shame and sorrow, and the possibility of physical immortality."*1

There are numerous recent books on the subject of sin: Christianity and Sin by Robert Mackintosh, The Christian Experience of Forgiveness by H. R. Mackintosh, and others. But none of these profess to be a fully developed theory of sin, though they are all modern in thought and treatment.

*1. Page 141

Christianity and Sin is probably the best book on the subject in simple form. There are two other books which give a critical survey of the doctrine of sin. One is The Doctrine of Sin by R.S. Moxon and Modern Theories of Sin by W.E.Orchard.

Moxon takes a wider field than Orchard does; the sub-title of his book is "a critical and historical investigation into the views of the concept of sin held in early Christian, Medieval and Modern times." He treats the subject quite well, though, because of the wider scope, he cannot be as extensive as Orchard in his criticism. It is an appreciative survey. The last third of the book is devoted to the modern doctrines and to what he calls "an attempt at reconstruction of the concept of sin based on the known facts of psychological evolution and on the new science of psycho-analysis." He says that this psychological view of sin must and does harmonize the recognized facts of evolution and the spiritual fact of sin and sense of sin as felt universally by man. This constructive statement is far more satisfactory than that given in Orchard's, for this reason: the latter does not recognize the fact of guilt. A statement illustrative of Moxon's modern empiricism --"Original Sin may be defined as the universal tendency in man, inherited by him from his animal ancestry, to gratify the natural instincts and passions and to use them for selfish ends."[1] "Actual sin", he says, "manifests itself as selfishness resulting from over-individualised personality."

[1] Doctrine of Sin 246f.

I will consider briefly Orchard's statement of sin, in which he dissolves away the guilt which we impute to ourselves. He begins by stripping the sense of sin of its authority; because of its relativity we are "bound to assume.... at the outset that this factor of varying degrees of susceptibility does seriously affect our problem, and introduces an element, the cause of which being unknown, prohibits us from settling in any given case the proportion of blame due to any man for his sin."*1 The sense of sin then does nothing to determine guilt; it merely indicates the emergence of the moral ideal. Thus he separates the sense of sin from the judgement of guilt, which is "not a feeling, but is an intellectual judgement." Granting the distinction which Orchard makes, I still think he has no right to abolish guilt. He is getting tangled up in a chain of logic that is not quite logical. If guilt is an "intellectual judgement" that does not abolish it. Orchard says that if you take any given circumstance of actual sin, you can by changing some of the elements in the case avoid the actual sin; at least, he says, we cannot say that any actual sin might not have been avoided had circumstances been different. That does not eliminate guilt; allowing for all the elements internal and external which seem to have driven an individual to sin, there is still an element of personal, deliberate sin or it is no sin at all. Without resorting to the dangerous practice of

*1. Orchard 125

unlimited supposition, we judge coolly and calmly that there have been times when we have deliberately done wrong. If we are not morally blameworthy, then we can trust no moral judgements and are not ourselves moral creatures. We cannot pronounce accurately on the actual guilt of any act or upon a life as a whole; we do not know just how blameworthy we are before God or just the actual evil effect of any action of ours upon ourselves or society. But we can see that reason demands that there be blame if there is praise; that reason asserts without equivocation that where there is no possibility of moral blameworthiness there is no morality. The question of punishment does not affect the problem. If there are moral values, moral goodness, moral praise, there is possibility of guilt in the same degree.

The next snag on which Orchard sticks is this: if there is such a thing as guilty sin, God cannot forgive it without violating reason, ethics, and His own nature. The difficulty is in thinking of guilt as without any degrees and of right as absolute justice with exact payment of dues. Orchard appreciates the reality of God's forgiving love, but he still thinks of guilt as something that cannot be forgiven. It is an intellectual moat that I think cannot remain long in a Christian's eye. Our judgement is that only guilty sin need be forgiven and that only thus is God's love shown.

Orchard's theory is somewhat as follows: Man is finite, limited, and quite imperfect and unlovely, apparently a mere animal. God draws near and man's moral consciousness is awakened. It causes pain to the heart of God to witness so closely man's imperfection and the greatest evidence of His love is in the giving of His Son. Man also is pained when he realizes his condition. Some men yield to the moral ideal and find peace in the life of conformity. Others turn their backs on God and continue in their imperfection; when at the end of an indefinite period they are faced again by the light of God, the pain they experience will be in proportion to their rejection of God. Sooner or later all sin must cease to be "either by our cheerful acceptance of God's will for us, or only after long and severe discipline has convinced us that God's will and our own deepest desires are for one and the same end."*[1] This he thinks accounts for all the facts of sin and redemption.

It is an optimistic outlook, as he intended it should be, and it takes into consideration most of the psychology of sin and redemption.Despite the fact that it explains so many of the facts of sin, yet it is meaningless without the recognition of guilt. I think that practically Orchard recognizes what is generally meant by guilt, i.e. moral blameworthiness, but he does not admit it.And then again, he might accuse me of Manichaeistic tendencies, but I cannot be too optimistic about the final abolition of all sin.

*1. Ibid. 162

This survey of current theories leaves us with the impression that sin is a hopeless problem that can be made just what one desires to make it. Since the systems have been diverse in treatment the criticism has been the same. But the conclusion I have reached is this; in general the correct theory of sin is that which harmonizes the facts of evolution with the affirmations of religion and the religious consciousness. To use our present material -- Tennant's and Pfleiderer's empirical evolution plus Kant's strong moral affirmations plus Ritschl's social sin -- these elements and some others all need a place in our system or doctrine of sin.

IV

Constructive Statement

A. Nature of Sin.

My procedure in this constructive statement may not seem to be the most logical, but I think it will give the emphasis I wish to give. I will first treat sin as it is regarded by religion and morals, sin as a fact of consciousness. Then after treating of its nature as generally accepted in the deepest feeling of Christianity, I will consider the question of its source. That will lead to the empirical procedure which Pfleiderer, Tennant, and the modern psychologists follow. In division B under section I,I have stated definite conclusions on some of the problems; this will be not much more than a succinct statement of a suggested theory of sin. It necessarily will be eclectic and summary.

1. Wilful violation of known law --

It may seem inconsistent to define sin so narrowly after giving such an inclusive definition in I B. But I do not intend to limit sin to the wilful violation of known law, so I will restate the definition of sin. Sin is that which does not tend to produce or tends not to produce that ideal goal for mankind, which goal is a hierarchy of values and has for its key personality. Of course this definition applies

only to the activity of moral beings. Guilty sin is that which knowingly hinders or fails to aid the progress of mankind toward that goal. Man is morally blameworthy only for what he does knowingly. It is asked, Why, if only knowing sin is guilty, include every activity of man which hinders said progress as sin? Only guilty sin is sin in the strict sense and practically that is the meaning which the term "sin" has acquired. But theoretically, that definition of sin is too narrow.

It used to be thought that ethics was limited to the very definite choices between right and wrong. The modern valuational outlook has shown that all of life is shot through with morality; Rickert and Windelband say that there is an "ought" in every detail of life, and there is. This kind of an ethical conception fills all of life with profound significance; it is supremely personal, teleological, religious and moral. One who holds that ethics is this kind of a science of values and that every value has an ought cannot be content with saying that sin is just a wilful violation of known law. Guilty sin is such a violation, but life is pregnant with morality and sin. The least opportunity, the lowest value, have claims on us. From the most deliberate, purposeful crime sin drops by almost imperceptible degrees to the shadows of the subconscious and the non-moral.

The moral life is not conformity to a few set objective rules, it is a dynamic thing, it is increasing awareness to the "oughtness" of life and the ready response to it.

It may be said that I am confusing sin with imperfections; I think not. Imperfection is part of the race; individual imperfections are part of each one of us. Imperfection is the "given" in us out of which we are growing. Imperfection hampers us and causes us pain, but it is not always sin. Sin and imperfection are contiguous. They are both imperfection in human nature: the most deliberate wrong-doing is one extreme; given imperfection with responsibility on God or society but not on the individual is the other extreme. The moral blameworthiness is measured by the degree of knowledge or the degree of capability to be otherwise. It is a sliding scale: the moral individual is progressively realizing the responsibility of eliminating imperfection; and on the other hand the imperfection which is unconscious or "given" is slowly rising to imperfection which is conscious or knowing. Imperfection will never become altogether conscious nor will it ever become altogether unconscious. God has made us finite, growing creatures; we shall never be anything else. There maybe some imperfections to which we are heir which we shall never be able to overcome and for which we shall never be responsible. On the other hand, we would have to drop back to the brute or to insanity

to become altogether irresponsible; and probably there is a kind of responsibility even among insane persons. Picture imperfection as a pole protruding from the surface of a lake; the depths of the lake represent unconsciousness and the atmosphere above the surface represents consciousness. The top of the pole is clearly seen and part of that which is beneath the surface. Picture the pole slowly rising -- that is the growing moral life. That is the relation between sin and imperfection. It is sinful not to endeavor to burn the pole (imperfection) off at the surface and it is sinful not to keep raising the pole that more may be burned off.

This has been to show the progressiveness of the moral life and the shades by which conscious, wilful sin becomes unconscious imperfection of any kind. The reason that I call this division the "wilful violation of known law" was that I might make clear the fact that there is such a thing. At the other end of the pole from unwitting imperfection is deliberate, purposeful violation of known law. To deny this is to submerge ourselves and abolish morals.

2. Guilt --

The existence of guilt is affirmation of the moral and religious consciousness. It is not an empirical assertion and cannot be arrived at by an empirical study alone. The naturalistic evolutionist can never make ethics anything more than utility. Moral blameworthiness cannot attach to any

being that is not morally conscious and created a moral being by God. It is the normal moral judgement of man that there is an intrinsically right and an intrinsically wrong, that we are free to act rightly or wrongly, and that we are responsible for acting wrongly insofar as we know we are doing so. This judgement exists indelibly regardless of the variations in particular cases.

Some wrongly identify guilt and punishment. Guilt may mean either liability to punishment or moral blameworthiness. A man may violate any ~~o~~ objective law unknowingly and yet be subject to punishment and guilty in that sense. Nature condemns her subjects whether they violate her laws deliberately or unwittingly. Punishment is an insoluble problem as far as the limits of this life are concerned. The wicked blossom as the green bay tree and the righteous bide their time convinced that in the next life goodness shall be rewarded. The office of punishment the theist believes is largely disciplinary and corrective. This does not abolish law and put in its place a backboneless ~~insipid~~ sentiment. The Christian is convinced of the grandeur and sternness of the moral law and the awfulness of violating it. And yet we cannot affirm that there will be exact payment of rewards and exact inflicting of punishments. The Christian's faith in the goodness of God is sufficient answer to this problem; both justice and love are commingled in the death on the Cross.

But ethics and religion use the term guilt in a different sense; it is moral blameworthiness incurred only in rational wilful violation of known law. There are degrees in guilt passing from the most glaring and deliberate to that which hovers between guilt and innocent imperfection. Guilt is in inverse proportion to the incapability of acting otherwise than wrongly. The force of heredity, environment, and evil example towards sin lessens guilt; the same may be said of ignorance. Sin and guilt do not burst into life as a thundercloud; they emerge gradually.

There is a distinction between actual guilt and the sense of guilt; by actual guilt is meant blameworthiness according to the knowledge of good the individual has, not according to a absolute unchangeable standard. The second phrase, sense of guilt, is a misnomer, or at least it is not quite clear. Guilt is a judgement of blameworthiness; the sense of sin is a complex of religious debasement before God, of psychological depression and pathology, of judgement of guilt. The modern psycho-analysts have emphasized the second of these elements and the first until they have lost sight of the third altogether. Combine with their conclusions the scientist's tendency toward determinism and the sense of sin becomes a phantom and the judgement of guilt pure "schein". Granting the other elements in the sense of sin and granting the discrepancy between actual sin and the sense of sin, the Christian still affirms that there is such a thing as guilt. If there is no guilt, there is no morality.

3. Depravity --

I mean by this term the effect that wrong-doing, deliberate wrong-doing particularly, has upon the individual and upon society. There is ~~no~~ a distinct difference between the animal impulses which remain in man and the depravity of will which is brought about by man's own moral wrong-doing. The one is somewhat outside the will, the other is a perversion of the will itself. The one is morally neutral, the other is morally blameworthy. The one is the "material" of sin as Tennant calls it, the other is the most tragic element in sin itself.

In the first place, it would never be questioned that individuals become morally depraved by their own sinful life. Their conduct not only brings suffering and external pain to themselves and society, but it also blunts their moral sensibilities, discolors their souls, and paralyzes their wills for good. This is a phenomena that we observe only in man. The rejection of the higher principles of life and conduct sends man, not down to the animal kingdom, but below the animals to grovel in moral degradation. It is not common for moral beings to descend so low, but the principle is true, i.e. the nobler the possibilities for good the deeper dyed the sin. Of course the more evil the individual becomes the less moral consciousness he has and possibly the less responsibility attaches to particular deeds. But for one created

for moral alertness and for communication with deity, such a condition of moral insensibility is intrinsically the most undesirable.

But depravity is also social, not in the sense that Augustine interpreted it, but as Ritschl interpreted it in his Kingdom of Sin. As Schleiermacher said, it is " in each the work of all and in all the work of each." We are heirs to the evil of our forefathers and we contribute to the evil; the social solidarity of sin binds us together inextricably. Some sin of ours may influence a life near us and continue to spread like the ripples from a pebble dropped in the water. Every good and every evil deed is falling on the surface of society like rain; we cannot compute the actual effect of any deed or life. We can but console ourselves by our good intentions and by the predominance of the good over the evil in our lives. Besides the native impulses to which every child is heir, there is the evil influence of society, i.e. heredity, and environment, education, and everything that is the result of past sin. Men have sinned and the influence of sin has been spreading ever since the first wrong-doing of a moral being. That is the truth which is represented by Ritschl's Kingdom of Sin. The realization of the tremendous extent and blackness of sin and the individual's responsibility for his part in it has been a characteristic of all the greatest religious souls. For a man to deny the truth of it is to brand himself as somewhat insensible morally.

B. Origin of Sin.

An understanding of the origin of sin is quite necessary to modify and to rationalize the doctrine. But no theory of its origin can negate the existence of moral evil. The pronouncements of the moral nature must be harmonized with the facts of experience and the laws of the intellect; of course the more vivid an element is the more firmly one is convinced of its truth, but one can never invalidate another. I re-iterate with Kant, Troeltsch, Otto, and Bowne that the moral nature and the religious nature stand in their own right.

1. Individual choice in time (not universal) --

This is the first suggestion as to the origin of sin. It might be suggested that each individual comes to the first moral choice, pauses perfectly balanced, then makes the choice either for good or evil. The life subsequent follows the choice that is made at that moment. Probably not every one makes the choice for evil, but it is apparent that most people do. Regardless of the conditions of society each individual comes to the moment of absolutely undetermined choice and makes the decision for right of wrong.

I do not know that this theory of the rise of sin has been suggested, but I am just erecting it to note its impracticality. It does not appreciate the super-individual, progressive character of sin and it does not have a regard for the actual psychological beginnings of sin.

2. Primitive fall and original sin --

By this I understand the doctrine somewhat as it was presented by Augustine and the older church theologians. It is the opposite extreme from Pelagianism. It teaches the fall of the first man and the actual or representative participation of every man in that act. It teaches the guilty depravity of every infant. Humanity is a massa perditionis, utterly incapable of any good and meriting eternal punishment even before any sinful act is committed. Despite this and despite the fact that Augustine was a predestinarian, he still tried to preach human freedom.

The objections to this are manifold. Human nature condemns it as utterly dark, cold, and opposed to God and man alike. The only redeeming features about it are that it arises in religious men in the midst of a heathen world and that it has a sense of the grave character of sin. Against it we may say that guilt is inalienable; that man is made in the image of God and is depraved only as he turns from God; That humanity's virtue is its own and not a foreign divine element; that men are free to choose the right and the grace of God; that this theory does not agree with the psychological, empirical beginnings of sin.

3. Extra-temporal or timeless origin --

We have considered Kant's timeless choice, Coleridge's timeless act of all wills collectively, and Müller's extra-temporal choice of the self principle. Our conclusions

were against them for the following reasons: they are too speculative and abstract; they conceive of sin as a fall from a state of absolutely balanced impulses; they do not appreciate the evolutionary character of morality. These men were convinced of the reality of sin and freedom and were seeking for a rational account of it. Their account reveals the necessity of a new conception of the struggles within the moral self.

4. Empiricism and conclusion --

This new study of the origin of sin is the result of science, evolution, and psychology. It is represented in this paper by Pfleiderer and Tennant. It propounds first that the race has developed from the crudest life to our present moral status, allowing ~~possibly~~ for the creative power of God at the moment when reason and morality emerge. It propounds that the development of the individual is the same; that there is first the predominance of impulses and the assertion of will for the protection of self; that there is the gradual dawn of the moral law, the failure of the self-centred will to conform, and the gradual increase of guilt from zero. This accounts for the prevalence of sin, for the struggle out of which sin arises, for the degrees of guilt, for the selfishness of the will at the awakening of moral consciousness. It rationalizes the sin of the earliest man and the sin of individuals today. It accounts for the presence of sin in the growing life of man, and yet at the same time recognizes the personal guilt of those who knowingly do wrong.

I conclude with asserting the facts of the moral consciousness, i.e. the reality of moral evil, guilt, and depravity, individual and social; and with adopting the evOlutionary account of the origin of sin. These two have been regarded by some as necessarily contradictory. If either is extreme they are contradictory, but modified their harmonization gives the only rational account of the nature and origin of sin.

C. Redemption.

The Christian doctrine of sin is greatly influenced by its doctrine of redemption and vice versa. Ritschl started from the Christian experience of justification and reconciliation to formulate his concept of sin. While he was somewhat limited in his field, we must recognize that his principle is valid as far as it goes. We can never know the measure of the darkness of sin until the light of the Gospel in the face of Jesus Christ illumines our moral consciousness. And we cannot conceive of the love and forgiveness of God until we see the self-sacrifice of God in Christ reconciling the world to Himself. These two poles are the genius of Christianity - a perception of the ~~great~~ awfulness of sin and a grasp of and trust in a loving God and Redeemer. As generations come and go Christian Redemption stands out pure, sublime, satisfying the individual's and the race's needs; and the world's greatest need is victory over moral evil.

Summary

The modern interpretation of sin is quite revolutionary both in the popular attitude on the question and in the systematic treatment of it. The subject does not have widespread interest today. There are some serious-minded people to whom sin is the same fearsome spectre it always was, but in general society regards it without any qualms and indulges without too many compunctions of consc science. There are reasons for this situation, some of which are happy and predictive of good, some of which are deplorable.

The irreligious spirit of today has tended to wipe out the sense of sin, which thrives best in sensitive religious souls. That spirit is balanced by strong social consciousness with the result that sin is strictly moral and not religious. Psycho-analysts are revealing the pathological element in the sense of sin with the result that the judgment of guilt no longer has any part in the sense of sin. Beginning with Schleiermacher religious thinking has had for its key and cue religious experience itself; that is one reason for the anthropological emphasis of today. Evolution with its theory of the progressiveness of the race and the individual has revolutionized history. Rationalism has rejected authoritarianism and supernaturalism. Science has tended toward determinism because of its persistent effort to fill out the chain of cause and effect. These influences

are valuable but their inferences have been carried to extremes so that religious sensitiveness and the moral judgement of guilt have been slipping from us.

I spent relatively a long time in discussion of the problems of sin. It may seem a little out of proportion but the clarification of some difficulties and the statement of some definitions before the treatment of the current theories seemed advisable. Sin is that activity of moral individuals which tends not to produce for all mankind the goal which is set up by Ideal Utilitarianism; that goal is a complex hierarchy of values with personality as its key. That is the broad definition of sin. Guilty sin is the wil~~l~~ful knowing hindrance of the progress toward that goal. I first give the broad definition of sin to objectify morals and sin, and to give a stimulus to the moral person not only to seek conformity with his own standard of life but also to raise his standard. It is a truism to say that freedom of the will is necessary to morals. Sin is a step downward; sin has an accumulative effect on the individual and society. Evolution gives the most satisfactory account of the origin of sin, if it accepts these truths which the Fall and original sin try to express.

None of the necessitarian theories of sin really allow for sin at all. If moral evil is necessary it is not moral evil. Had these men, Hegel, Schelling, Weisse, understood the empirical origin of sin they might have been free-

domists. They were driven, by the inexplicability of sin as a fall from pure maturity, to assert that God was the author of it. The freedomistic theories have all made contributions, but they have all been limited. Müller and Kant started from conscience, the moral law, freedom and guilt; in seeking the origin of sin they fell into unnecessary speculation. Schleiermacher and Ritschl were less dogmatic and philosophical; starting from Christian experience itself they made distinct advances. The importance of Pfleiderer and Tennant is that they introduced the psychological and evolutionary account of sin.

The Christian doctrine of sin asserts the autonomous, authoritative place of the moral and the religious nature. They are subject to development; that is the only way they find themselves. But regardless of development and variation the great moral principles remain, that is, freedom, goodness, moral evil, and guilt. It asserts the religious character of sin, that sin is most clearly revealed in the light of the Gospel and Christian redemption. It asserts the depravity of the individual that sins and the evil influence of a society whose members sin. It asserts the gradual emergence of morality and the self-centredness of the will through activity before moral consciousness. Some think that these assertions cannot be harmonized. They must be, they will be, and they are being harmonized.

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